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Trading Safety for Innovation and Access: An 
Empirical Evaluation of the FDA’s Premarket 
Approval Process 
George Horvath* 
Congress created the premarket approval process (PMA) to provide 
a rigorous safety evaluation of high-risk medical devices before they may 
be sold on the U.S. market. Evaluating a PMA application requires the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to conduct a lengthy, complex, 
and costly assessment of the extensive data a manufacturer must 
submit. But other policy concerns, notably a fear of hampering 
innovation and a desire to assure timely access to new technologies, have 
led Congress to relax some of the rigorous data requirements the PMA 
process imposes on manufacturers. Congress mandates that the FDA 
employ the “least burdensome” approach to regulation that allows a 
reasonable assurance of safety. The FDA has interpreted this as 
permitting it, among other things, to approve high-risk devices based on 
small, short-duration clinical trials the designs of which fall short of the 
most rigorous scientific standards. Congress also created “PMA 
Supplement” pathways that allow manufacturers to modify their PMA-
approved devices with only limited supporting data. And Congress 
included several provisions in the recently-enacted 21st Century Cures 
Act that further tip the balance away from ensuring device safety. 
Scholars writing in the medical literature have raised concerns that 
the standards for PMA approval have become too relaxed, potentially 
compromising device safety. But most empirical studies have focused on 
the less rigorous 510(k) pathway, which is designed for low- and 
medium-risk devices. These studies provide limited evidence about how 
frequently PMA-approved devices fail. And no empirical work has 
examined whether these failures are related to the statutes and 
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regulations through which Congress and the FDA have attempted to 
balance safety against innovation and access. This Article begins such 
an examination, presenting the results of a new empirical study of 
PMA-approved devices. The study finds that under a best-case scenario 
at least 4.6%–6% of PMA-approved devices will fail in such a way as to 
threaten death or serious and permanent harm. Complex 
cardiovascular devices and devices that have been frequently and 
rapidly modified through certain PMA supplements are most likely 
to  fail. 
Based on the concerns that have been raised and on the findings of 
this study, this Article suggests that Congress and the FDA should take 
steps to readjust the balance between safety on one hand and innovation 
and access on the other. The FDA should insist on scientifically rigorous, 
longer-duration clinical trials before approving PMA applications. 
Further, the FDA should limit the number of significant modifications 
that manufacturers of certain devices are permitted to make to a device 
through PMA supplements before a thorough safety assessment is 
required, and should limit how soon after one significant modification 
is approved that a second modification will be considered. Finally, 
Congress should amend the 21st Century Cures Act to avoid further 
tipping the balance between safety, innovation, and access away from 
the FDA’s primary mission of ensuring medical device safety. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The central question concerning the performance of the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) is whether its regulation of a broad 
range of products sold in the United States achieves a 
desirable  balance between the often-competing policy objectives of 
assuring  safety, efficacy, innovation, and access.1 Congress, through 
the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA),2 assigned to the 
FDA the primary—and in some cases the sole—responsibility of 
assuring that medical devices are safe and effective.3 Fulfilling this 
responsibility requires the FDA to conduct a lengthy, complex, and 
 
 1.  See generally Robert M. Califf, Benefit-Risk Assessments at the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration: Finding the Balance, 317 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 693 (2017). 
 2.  Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). 
 3.  See 121 CONG. REC. 1859 (1975) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). 
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costly assessment before a device is marketed, including scrutiny of 
the uses for which a device is intended; the design, components, 
manufacturing plans, and labeling; and non-clinical and clinical 
studies.4 But other policy objectives weigh against such a rigorous 
process.5 First, the costs imposed by the premarket review process 
must not be so high as to discourage manufacturers from engaging 
in the research and development necessary to create new, potentially 
life-saving technologies. Clinical studies of sufficient quality to 
establish device safety and efficacy are expensive and complex.6 And 
the regulatory process itself is expensive.7 Second, the delays 
imposed by the review process must not prevent patients from 
gaining access to newly-developed technologies in a timely fashion.8 
Thus, rigorous premarket evaluation must be balanced against the 
dangers of overly-stringent regulation.9 
Congress and the FDA have sought to balance these concerns 
through several mechanisms. The amount and types of data required 
 
 4.  21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1) (2012) (establishing requirements for premarket 
evaluation); Aaron V. Kaplan et al., Medical Device Development: From Prototype to Regulatory 
Approval, 109 CIRCULATION 3068, 3072 (2004) (“[T]he demonstration of safety and efficacy 
for a new medical device is a long, arduous, and expensive developmental path from early 
concept to introduction into clinical practice.”). 
 5.  Richard A. Deyo, Gaps, Tensions, and Conflicts in the FDA Approval Process: 
Implications for Clinical Practice, 17 J. AM. BOARD FAM. PRAC. 142, 145–47 (2004). 
 6.  See David Steinberg et al., Building a Business Model in Digital Medicine, 33 
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 910, 914 box2 (2015) (noting that the premarket studies required 
to bring a new device to market can cost nearly $100 million). 
 7.  Application fees for approval to market a medical device can be as high as 
$310,764. FY 2018 MDUFA User Fees, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/ 
ForIndustry/UserFees/MedicalDeviceUserFee/ucm452519.htm (last updated Oct. 3, 2017). 
 8.  Califf, supra note 1, at 693. 
 9.  21 C.F.R. § 814.2 (2017) (stating that premarket review must be both “efficient” 
and “thorough”); see also Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 326 (2008) (“[T]he 
solicitude for those injured by FDA-approved devices . . . was overcome in Congress’s 
estimation by solicitude for those who would suffer without new medical devices . . . .”); 
Califf, supra note 1, at 693; Diana M. Zuckerman et al., Medical Device Recalls and the FDA 
Approval Process, 171 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1006, 1006 (2011). Other concerns include 
the possibility that over-regulation may have far-reaching effects on the economy. See William 
H. Maisel, Medical Device Regulation: An Introduction for the Practicing Physician, 140 
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 296, 301 (2004); Sriram Thirumalai & Kingshuk K. Sinha, Product 
Recalls in the Medical Device Industry: An Empirical Exploration of the Sources and Financial 
Consequences, 57 MGMT. SCI. 376, 376 (2011) (citing 2006 data showing overall medical 
device industry revenue of $90 billion); cf. Eva Stensvad & Ralph F. Hall, Left to Their Own 
Devices: IOM’s Medical Device Committee’s Failure to Comply, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 75, 
76 (2012) (citing 2011 data that the U.S. device market was $105.8 billion).  
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for device approval varies based on risk.10 Manufacturers may market 
the lowest-risk (Class I) devices without informing the FDA 
beforehand.11 Manufacturers seeking to market moderate-risk (some 
Class I and most Class II) devices must submit a “510(k) 
notification,” which requires evidence that the device is 
“substantially equivalent” to a device already on the market.12 
Manufacturers seeking to market the highest-risk (Class III) devices 
must submit a lengthy and detailed “Premarket Approval” (PMA) 
application.13 This tiered premarket evaluation scheme allows for 
faster, less expensive approvals for devices that pose only low to 
moderate risks or that are similar to devices already on the market.14 
Even for the highest-risk, Class III, devices, Congress requires 
the FDA to choose the “least burdensome” regulatory approach that 
provides “a reasonable assurance of safety.”15 Following the least 
burdensome principle, the FDA frequently grants approvals based on 
clinical trials the design or execution of which falls short of the 
generally accepted standards of scientific rigor.16 Further, Congress 
 
 10.  21 U.S.C. § 360c(a) (2012) (establishing classification scheme for devices); see also 
Robert B. Leflar, Public Accountability and Medical Device Regulation, 2 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 
1, 7−8 (1989). 
 11. Class I/II Exemptions, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Medical 
Devices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/ClassifyYourDevice/ucm051549.htm (last 
updated June 26, 2014). These devices, such as tongue depressors and bandages, are 
“exempted” from premarket review. Manufacturers must often comply with post-marketing 
requirements, including registering annually with the FDA, ensuring the device labeling 
comports with FDA regulations, and following determined Good Manufacturing Practices. Id. 
 12.  21 C.F.R. § 807.87(l) (2017). 
 13.  21 U.S.C. § 360c(a). 
 14.  See Stensvad & Hall, supra note 9, at 82 (reporting that in 2012 the fee charged to 
a manufacturer for a 510(k) application was $4049, compared with $220,050 for a PMA 
application); Zuckerman et al., supra note 9, at 1009 (citing 2005 data showing that “the 
average cost for the FDA to review a 510(k) submission was estimated at $18,200, while a 
PMA submission cost the agency $870,000 to review”). For 2018, the user fees are $10,566 
for a 510(k) application and $310,764 for a new PMA application. FY 2018 MDUFA User 
Fees, supra note 7. 
 15.  21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(3)(D)(ii); 21 C.F.R. § 860.7; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 
THE LEAST BURDENSOME PROVISIONS OF THE FDA MODERNIZATION ACT OF 1997: 
CONCEPT AND PRINCIPLES; FINAL GUIDANCE FOR FDA AND INDUSTRY (2002) [hereinafter 
LEAST BURDENSOME PROVISIONS], http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/Device 
RegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/ucm085999.pdf. 
 16.  See Jonas Zajac Hines et al., Left to Their Own Devices: Breakdowns in United States 
Medical Device Premarket Review, PLOS MED., July 2010, at 1, 6 (detailing how “the FDA 
appears to have permitted scientific approaches that fall short of rigorous” in the PMA 
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has created pathways—PMA Supplements—through which 
manufacturers can modify PMA-approved devices without 
submitting data establishing the safety of “the entire device.”17 
Instead, they need only provide data that is “relevant to the 
proposed changes.”18 The FDA is committed to reviewing 
Supplemental PMA applications quickly, through the use of the most 
limited form of review available.19 
The impact of these attempts to balance safety with innovation 
and access through the use of less rigorous review standards and 
mechanisms is unclear. Courts, legal scholars, and the medical 
literature have all examined aspects of this balance. Courts, 
fashioning an expansive preemption doctrine, have been reluctant to 
disturb the balance Congress and the FDA have struck.20 Legal 
scholars, criticizing the expansive application of preemption doctrine, 
have focused on the possibility that limitations in the FDA’s 
premarket review, coupled with a lack of state oversight, 
compromises safety.21 The medical literature has focused on specific 
weaknesses in the PMA review process.22 
 
approval process). As one example, the FDA may approve a device on the basis of a single 
clinical trial, 21 C.F.R. § 814.20(b)(7), whereas for drugs at least two trials are 
generally required. 
 17.  1 CHARLES S. ZIMMERMAN, PHARMACEUTICAL AND MEDICAL DEVICE 
LITIGATION § 1:17 (2017). 
 18.  21 C.F.R. § 814.39(c)(1). 
 19.  Office of Device Evaluation, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/ 
AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDRH/CDRHOffices/uc
m115879.htm (last updated Nov. 1, 2017). 
 20.  Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc, 552 U.S. 312, 326 (2008) (noting that Congress’s 
“solicitude for those injured by FDA-approved devices . . . was overcome in Congress’s 
estimation by solicitude for those who would suffer without new medical devices”); 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 477 (1996) (“Despite its relatively innocuous 
phrasing, . . . the ‘premarket approval,’ or ‘PMA’ process, is a rigorous one.”); see also A 
Delicate Balance: FDA and the Reform of the Medical Device Approval Process: Hearing Before 
the Spec. Comm. on Aging, 112th Cong. 81, 88 (2011) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of 
Ralph D. Hall, Distinguished Professor and Practitioner, University of Minnesota Law School). 
 21.  See, e.g., Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Navigating Between Scylla and Charybdis: 
Preemption of Medical Device “Parallel Claims,” 9 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 159, 
211 (2013). 
 22.  See infra Part III. 
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But little empirical work has examined how well the PMA 
pathway serves to ensure device safety.23 And no empirical work has 
attempted to link the outcomes of PMA review with the statutory 
and regulatory framework that structures that review. Of the few 
empirical studies that have examined the PMA pathway, all but one 
used a methodology that underestimates the rate at which the overall 
safety assessment fails to detect problems that can lead to fatal or 
seriously-harmful failures. The one prior study that used a better-
adapted methodology examined only a small number of devices for a 
short period of time. And no prior study has attempted to uncover 
the factors that may predict failures in PMA-approved devices.24 
This Article presents a novel empirical study of serious failures of 
PMA-approved devices. Under a set of best-case assumptions,25 
4.6%–6% of PMA-approved, high-risk devices have failed in ways the 
FDA determined to have created the most serious threats to patients’ 
health and lives.26 These failures have involved widely-distributed 
devices: over 660,000 individual device units, including life-
sustaining products such as artificial hearts, vascular stents, and 
anesthesia administration systems were potentially at risk of failure.27 
These study findings suggest that Congress and the FDA have not 
managed to strike an acceptable balance between safety on the one 
hand and innovation and access on the other. I use the study 
findings to suggest several regulatory and statutory changes in the 
PMA framework that would result in improved safety for 
these  devices. 
The empirical study presented here is particularly relevant 
because the mechanisms available to ensure safety once a device 
reaches the market—ex post regulatory methods—are limited. The 
FDA can require manufacturers of PMA-approved devices to 
conduct post-market studies and surveillance.28 But the FDA’s 
authority is circumscribed both by statutory provisions and by 
 
 23.  Most studies of how well FDA premarket evaluation functions to ensure safety have 
focused on the 510(k) clearance pathway. See infra, Part III. 
 24.  See infra Part IV. 
 25.  See infra Part VI. 
 26.  See infra Part IV. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  21 C.F.R. § 814.82 (2017); JUDITH A. JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R42130, FDA REGULATION OF MEDICAL DEVICES 11 (2016) [hereinafter JOHNSON 2016]. 
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resource constraints. Commentators in the medical literature have 
questioned how effective these studies—and the FDA’s responses to 
their findings—have been.29 A recent U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) study found that delays were 
frequent.30 Even where studies are progressing on target, the FDA’s 
limited resources and their allocation may limit the Agency’s ability 
to monitor study progress. 
In addition, the other ex post regulatory system that might serve 
to expose device problems—litigation under state tort and product 
liability theories—is largely barred from application to PMA-
approved devices. Most state-law claims, such as those based on 
design defect and failure to warn, are expressly preempted by 21 
U.S.C. § 360k(a) and the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Riegel 
v. Medtronic.31 Other claims that might escape express preemption 
are likely barred under the Court’s implied preemption doctrine set 
out in Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee.32 Thus, so long as 
we rely on FDA premarket evaluation to ensure that the highest-risk 
devices are safe, it is important to examine critically how successfully 
the Agency and Congress have balanced safety with innovation 
and access. 
This Article begins in Part II with an examination of the ways in 
which Congress and the FDA have attempted to balance the 
competing priorities of assuring safety and avoiding the inhibition of 
 
 29.  See Prashant V. Rajan et al., Medical Device Postapproval Safety Monitoring: Where 
Does the United States Stand?, 8 CIRCULATION 124, 128 (2015) (“[I]t is unclear whether 
[post-market] studies themselves tend to not get done properly or whether the knowledge of 
their progress is just inexact. Moreover, the exact nature of FDA action after completion of the 
PAS and 522 studies is also not routinely disseminated.”); Rita F. Redberg et al., Power 
Morcellators, Postmarking Surveillance, and the US Food and Drug Administration, 318 J. AM. 
MED. ASS’N 325 (2017); Ian S. Reynolds et al., Assessing the Safety and Effectiveness of Devices 
After US Food and Drug Administration Approval: FDA-Mandated Postapproval Studies, 174 
J. AM. MED. ASS’N INTERNAL MED. 1773, 1776–77 (2014) (finding that delays in initiating 
PAS were common and noting that the FDA has never sanctioned a manufacturer for failing to 
start or complete a study, “which may undermine its authority in ordering these studies”). 
 30. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-815, MEDICAL DEVICES: FDA 
ORDERED POSTMARKET STUDIES TO BETTER UNDERSTAND SAFETY ISSUES, AND MANY 
STUDIES ARE ONGOING 14−15 (2015); Rajan et al., supra note 29, at 127 (finding twenty 
percent of FDA-ordered, post-market studies to be delayed). Most delays were attributed to 
low patient enrollment. Id. at 125. 
 31. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2012); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 330 (2008). 
 32. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001). 
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innovation and the restriction of access. Part III reviews the available 
empirical literature on the performance of PMA evaluation as it 
related to device safety. Part IV presents the methodology and results 
of my study of high-risk medical devices approved through the PMA 
process. Part V then interprets the study findings in light of the 
statutory and regulatory attempts at striking an appropriate balance. 
I make several suggestions for modifications to the FDA’s regulatory 
requirements and to Congress’s statutory framework that govern the 
PMA process. Finally, Part VI suggests that PMA-approved devices 
may fail even more frequently than the study data indicates, and 
outlines some directions for future empirical projects. 
II. THE STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF 
PREMARKET APPROVAL 
The FDA bears the primary responsibility for regulating medical 
devices marketed in the United States.33 In this role, the agency 
must balance competing concerns: ensuring that devices are safe and 
effective while not hampering innovation of and access to new 
technologies. These goals often conflict,34 simultaneously pushing 
the FDA’s premarket evaluation of devices toward being overly 
stringent and overly lax. 
On one hand, medical device failures impose substantial costs on 
patients and the health care system. Hundreds of thousands of U.S. 
patients have been treated with devices that may be more prone to 
failure than was recognized at the time the FDA granted its 
approval.35 Government data indicate that over 100,000 people 
 
 33. Marcia Boumil, FDA Approval of Drugs and Devices: Preemption of State Laws for 
“Parallel” Tort Claims, 18 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 1, 15 (2015). Regulatory authority is 
shared with other federal agencies, including the Federal Trade Commission, see 15 U.S.C. § 
52 (2012) (conferring authority over false advertising of drugs and devices), and with 
common-law tort systems, see Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) (federal courts in 
diversity jurisdiction applying state common law); Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179 (Vt. 2006) 
(state court applying common law), aff’d, 555 U.S. 555 (2009). The complex issues 
surrounding the allocation of regulatory authority, especially as between the states and the 
federal government, are largely beyond the scope of this article. 
 34. JOHNSON 2016, supra note 28, at 1–2; Califf, supra note 1, at 1. 
 35. JOHNSON 2016, supra note 28, at 2 (noting that many of the more than 500,000 
people in the United States who have received artificial hip joints have required a re-operation 
because of breakdowns of device components). 
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suffer a device-related injury annually.36 Independent analysts 
estimate that in a recent year medical device failures caused over 
4500 deaths.37 And the failure of just one medical device, the 
Medtronic Sprint Fidelis defibrillator lead, may cost Medicare 
anywhere from $287 million to almost $1.2 billion.38 These 
problems suggest the need for a stringent premarket evaluation of 
high-risk medical devices. 
On the other hand, Congress—and the public—want access to 
cutting-edge technology as quickly as possible after it is developed. 
But if the costs imposed by the approval process are too great, 
innovators may direct their research and development effort 
elsewhere. Bringing a new, high-risk device “from concept to 
market” currently costs nearly $100 million.39 Requiring more or 
larger or longer clinical studies for approval would increase this 
cost.40 An overly-stringent premarket evaluation process might delay 
newly-developed technologies reaching the market. Patients would 
suffer as a result. Further, over-regulation can have broad impacts on 
 
 36. JUDITH A. JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42130, FDA REGULATION OF 
MEDICAL DEVICES 2–3 (2012), https://ia801306.us.archive.org/35/items/R42130FDA 
RegulationofMedicalDevices-crs/R42130%20FDA%20Regulation%20of%20Medical%20Devic 
es.pdf [hereinafter JOHNSON 2012]; see also Medical Device Reporting (MDR), U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/Safety/ReportaProblem/ucm2005291 
.htm (last updated Nov. 7, 2016) (“Each year, the FDA receives several hundred thousand 
medical device reports of suspected device-associated deaths, serious injuries 
and malfunctions.”). 
 37. JOHNSON 2012, supra note 36, at 3 (citing data from 2009). 
 38. Amit K. Mehrotra et al., Medtronic Sprint Fidelis Lead Recall: Determining the 
Initial 5-Year Management Cost to Medicare, 8 HEART RHYTHM 1192, 1196 (2011), 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21377552. This study likely underestimates the total 
cost to Medicare because it considers only the cost of surgical removal of the leads and not the 
costs associated with increased monitoring, patient counseling, treatment of anxiety disorders 
related to the risk of failure and of suffering multiple shocks, and other care. However, similar 
estimates of the cost to Medicare have been derived by Fidelis plaintiffs’ lawyers. See H. 
DENNIS TOLLEY, EXAMINING THE SPRINT FIDELIS EFFECT ON MEDICARE COSTS 18 (2010) 
(estimating cost to Medicare system of Sprint Fidelis failure from $375 million to $1 billion). 
 39. Steinberg et al., supra note 6, at 914. 
 40. Manufacturers also object to a requirement for longer studies because the inevitable 
postponement in reaching the market can result in significant losses in the highly-competitive 
medical device marketplace. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., UNDERSTANDING BARRIERS TO 
MEDICAL DEVICE QUALITY 28 (2011), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA
/CentersOffices/CDRH/CDRHReports/UCM277323.pdf  (reporting industry views that 
“the primary focus for R&D is on timelines and that R&D is not incentivized on 
embedding quality”). 
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the economy. The medical device industry employs well over half-a-
million workers and generates over $197 billion in revenues 
annually.41 The FDA estimates that the products it regulates account 
for nearly twenty-five percent of consumer spending.42 These 
considerations argue in favor of a more limited premarket evaluation. 
Section II.A reviews the premarket evaluation process that 
Congress and the FDA have established to ensure the safety of high-
risk medical devices. Sections II.B and II.C then examine two 
subsequent changes in the statutory and regulatory framework that 
might compromise device safety by permitting approvals based on 
less-than-rigorous data. Section II.D discusses a provision of the 
recently-enacted 21st Century Cures Act that may further 
compromise device safety. 
A. The PMA Process: A Rigorous Framework to Ensure Medical 
Device Safety 
Congress enacted the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 
(MDA)43 in order to establish a unitary, nationwide regulatory floor 
ensuring device safety.44 The MDA vests all premarket device 
evaluation and approval authority in the FDA.45 For high-risk, “Class 
III” devices, the MDA outlines a rigorous premarket evaluation 
process.46 Manufacturers seeking to market a Class III device must 
submit a lengthy and detailed Premarket Approval (PMA) 
 
 41. JOHNSON 2016, supra note 28, at 2. 
 42. This includes all FDA-regulated products, including human and animal drugs, food, 
and cosmetics. The Food and Drug Administration Celebrates 100 Years of Service to the Nation, 
PHARMACEUTICAL ONLINE (Jan. 6, 2006), https://www.pharmaceuticalonline.com/doc
/the-food-and-drug-administration-celebrates-1-0001. 
 43. Medical Device Amendments of 1976 [hereinafter MDA], Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 
Stat. 539 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). 
 44. See id. at 539 (describing purpose as being “to provide for the safety and 
effectiveness of medical device [sic]”); 121 CONG. REC. 1859 (1975) (statement of Sen. 
Kennedy) (describing that Congress’s purpose was to “give[] the Food and Drug 
Administration the necessary authority to require that medical devices be proven safe and 
effective before they reach the American consumer”). 
 45. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e (2012). 
 46. Id. § 360c(a)(1)(C) (defining Class III devices as those which are intended “for a 
use in supporting or sustaining human life or for a use which is of substantial importance in 
preventing impairment of human health, or” which carry “a potential unreasonable risk of 
illness or injury”). 
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application.47 Although only one percent of devices have been 
approved through the PMA process, these devices are among the 
most critical, complex, and costly devices used in health care.48 
Applicants are required to submit clinical data demonstrating that 
the device is safe and effective.49 This includes “full reports of all 
information . . . concerning investigations which have been made to 
show whether or not such device is safe and effective.”50 Once a 
device is approved, the manufacturer is required to adhere to the 
design, manufacturing, and labeling specifications contained in its 
PMA application.51 
The extensive information in a new PMA application, typically 
running to several thousand pages, is often reviewed by an 
independent panel of experts in the field into which the device is 
 
 47. Id. New devices for which no predicate device can be identified are by default 
classified as Class III. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(f); JOHNSON 2016, supra note 28, at 22. 
Manufacturers of these devices can use the “de novo” process to attempt to avoid the expense 
and delay of a PMA application. JOHNSON 2016, supra note 28, at 22. Under the original de 
novo process, the manufacturer submitted a 510(k) application and a petition for 
reclassification of the device as a Class I or Class II device. Id. The FDA Safety and Innovation 
Act of 2012 (FDASIA) created a simplified de novo process through which a manufacturer 
may petition for reclassification without submitting a 510(k) application. Id. 
 48. JOHNSON 2016, supra note 28, at 4–5. 
 49. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d). 
 50. Id. § 360e(c)(1)(A). Manufacturers must also submit  
(B) a full statement of the components, ingredients, and properties and of the 
principle or principles of operation, of such device;  
(C) a full description of the methods used in, and the facilities and controls used for, 
the manufacture, processing, and, when relevant, packing and installation of, 
such  device;  
. . . . 
(E) such samples of such device and of components thereof as the Secretary may 
reasonably require . . . ; 
(F) specimens of the labeling proposed to be used for such device; [and]  
. . . . 
(H) such other information relevant to the subject matter of the application as the 
Secretary, with the concurrence of the appropriate panel under section 360c of this 
title, may require.  
Id. § 360e(c)(1). 
 51. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(5)(A)(i) (“A supplemental application shall be required for any 
change to a device subject to an approved application under this subsection that affects safety 
or effectiveness . . . .”); 21 C.F.R. § 814.80 (2017) (“A device may not be manufactured, 
packaged, stored, labeled, distributed, or advertised in a manner that is inconsistent with any 
conditions to approval specified in the PMA approval order for the device.”). 
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classified.52 The panel includes individuals with the specific “training 
and experience to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of the 
device[],” including those with “expertise in such fields as clinical 
and administrative medicine, engineering, biological and physical 
sciences, and other related professions.”53 
In determining the safety (and efficacy) of a device, Congress 
requires that the FDA weigh the probable health benefits against the 
probable risk of injury or illness resulting from the use of the 
device.54 The FDA’s decision whether to approve a PMA application 
is to be made “on the basis of well-controlled investigations, 
including 1 or more clinical investigations.”55 Through these 
requirements, Congress created a stringent process for the evaluation 
of the safety of high-risk devices.56 But safety was not Congress’s 
 
 52. 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c(b)(2), 360e(c)(3). 
 53. Id. § 360c(b)(2). Panels must also include non-voting representatives of consumers 
and the device industry, and may include members nominated by “[s]cientific, trade, and 
consumer organizations.” Id. 
 54. Id. § 360c(a)(2)(C); Califf, supra note 1, at 1. 
 55. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(3)(A). The provision that follows provides some latitude for 
the optional use of “valid scientific evidence” other than studies conducted in accord with § 
360c(a)(3)(A). See Id. § 360c(a)(3)(B). 
 56. Congress has continued to tinker with the premarket evaluation process, at times 
conferring additional authority on the FDA that tips the balance in favor of safety. Most of 
these changes are not directly related to the focus of this Article. The Safe Medical Devices Act 
(SDMA), addressed several weaknesses of the MDA that had become apparent. Ralph F. Hall 
& Michelle Mercer, Rethinking Lohr: Does “SE” Mean Safe and Effective, Substantially 
Equivalent, or Both?, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 737, 747–48 (2012). The Act permitted the 
FDA to impose a broader range of requirements on devices submitted through the 510(k) 
process, and to require safety and effectiveness data on devices with different technological 
characteristics from their predicate device. Id. at 748; JOHNSON 2016, supra note 28, at 45. 
The Act also authorized the FDA to require manufacturers of Class III devices that had been 
on the market when the MDA took effect to submit safety and effectiveness data, and to 
consider whether to reclassify those devices as Class I or II, or to retain the device as Class III 
(in which case the manufacturer would be required to submit a PMA application). Hall & 
Mercer, supra, at 750. Further, the Act required hospitals and other facilities that used medical 
devices to report device-related death, illness, or injury to the FDA. JOHNSON 2016, supra 
note 28, at 45. Under current regulations, manufacturers must report device-related deaths, 
injuries, and malfunctions to the FDA, while facilities must report only deaths to the FDA. 21 
C.F.R. § 803.10 (2017). The FDA Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA) subjected clinical trials 
of medical devices to the reporting requirements related to the clinicaltrial.gov database. ERIN 
D. WILLIAMS & SUSAN THAUL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34465, FDA AMENDMENTS ACT 
OF 2007 (P.L. 110-85), at CRS-67 (2008), research.policyarchive.org/18795.pdf. Before this, 
manufacturers were not required to report negative studies—studies showing that a device was 
not effective or not safe. FDAAA required that “results must be posted for clinical trials that 
form the primary basis of an efficacy claim” for medical device approvals. Id. at CRS-68. The 
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only concern. The need to balance ensuring safety with avoiding a 
detrimental effect on innovation and access was recognized during 
the debate over the MDA.57 Thus, Congress sought to create a 
system that provided for “the least regulation necessary to assure 
safety and effectiveness” of medical devices.58 
Congress utilized two “sliding scale” structures in its attempt to 
balance these concerns.59 First, the MDA created a three-tiered, risk-
based system of device classification.60 Class I devices are those that 
do not pose an unreasonable risk and are not intended for sustaining 
life, or for which general controls provide reasonable assurance of 
safety and efficacy.61 These are simple devices such as examination 
gloves and bandages.62 For these “exempted” devices, no premarket 
approval or clearance is necessary.63 
Class II devices, such as X-ray machines and certain hearing 
aids,64 are considered to present an intermediate level of risk. For 
these devices, “general controls by themselves are insufficient to 
provide reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness.”65 
Rather, compliance with “special controls” is deemed sufficient to 
 
FDAAA also sought to reduce conflicts of interest regarding members of the FDA advisory 
committees that evaluate and recommend whether to approve a PMA application. Id. at CRS-
60 to CRS-61. The Act also required the FDA to establish a unique device identifier system 
that would permit the tracking of individual devices. Id. at CRS-16. 
 57. See Joseph R. Radzius, Medical Devices and Judicial Legislation, 27 FOOD DRUG 
COSM. L.J. 639, 640–42 (1972) (emphasizing the need to design a system that balanced safety 
and innovation). 
 58. 122 CONG. REC. 13778 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Rogers, Chairman of the 
Health Subcommittee). 
 59. See Hall & Mercer, supra note 56, at 747; Leflar, supra note 10, at 7–8. 
 60. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a) (classifying devices based on their intended use, the availability 
of general controls to ensure safety, the risk inherent in the use of the device, and the 
seriousness of the condition for which its use is intended); see also Leflar, supra note 10, at 7. 
“Controls” are simply regulations that may apply to all devices or only to certain device types. 
See Hall & Mercer, supra note 56, at 746. 
 61. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A); Hall & Mercer, supra note 56, at 746. 
 62. 21 C.F.R. §§ 880.5075, 880.6250 (2017). 
 63. Id. Manufacturers must comply with post-marketing requirements, including 
registering annually with the FDA, ensuring the device labeling comports with FDA 
regulations, and following determined Good Manufacturing Practices. Class I/II Exemptions, 
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulation 
andGuidance/Overview/ClassifyYourDevice/ucm051549.htm (last updated June 26, 2014). 
 64. 21 C.F.R. §§ 892.1630, 874.3300. 
 65. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B). 
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provide an assurance of safety.66 Manufacturers seeking to market 
some Class I and most Class II devices must submit a 510(k) 
notification, which requires evidence that the device is “substantially 
equivalent” to a “predicate” device already on the market.67 Class III 
devices, as already noted, must typically be submitted through the 
rigorous PMA process.68 
The second sliding-scale that the MDA created was that differing 
amounts and types of data would be required for approval of devices 
in each class. The difference between the burdens imposed on Class I 
and II devices by the 510(k) substantial equivalence process and on 
Class III devices by the PMA process is profound. Applicants seeking 
510(k) clearance are required only to demonstrate that their device is 
“substantially equivalent” to an already-marketed device (a 
“predicate” device).69 Most importantly, clinical trial data is not 
typically required.70 
By providing manufacturers with a far less demanding pathway 
to the market through the 510(k) process, the MDA balanced 
rigorous safety assessment with the concerns over innovation and 
access. Not surprisingly, manufacturers often prefer to submit their 
devices through the faster and less expensive 510(k) pathway.71 
Unfortunately, the dividing line between devices required to 
undergo PMA evaluation and devices permitted to utilize the 510(k) 
clearance pathway is indistinct, affording manufacturers (and the 
FDA) latitude in deciding what pathway to use. As a result, the 
Court in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr noted that the vast majority of new 
Class III devices, many of which should have been evaluated through 
the PMA process, had been channeled through the 510(k) 
pathway.72 For many of these evaluations, the predicate device was a 
 
 66.  Hall & Mercer, supra note 56, at 746. Class II devices must also comply with all 
relevant general controls. Id. 
 67. Id. at 739–40. 
 68. JOHNSON 2016, supra note 28, at 22. 
 69. Id. at 4. 
 70. For a discussion of a different viewpoint, see infra, notes 76–77 and 
accompanying text. 
 71. Stensvad & Hall, supra note 9, at 83–84. 
 72. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 479 (1996). This was true even when, by 
statute, review should have been through the PMA process. See, e.g., Hines et al., supra note 
16, at 6 (recommending statutory changes aimed at eliminating the permissive approach of the 
510(k) pathway to technological differences and “steering such devices toward the PMA 
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pre-amendment device (one that was already on the market when 
the MDA was enacted in 1976) for which a safety evaluation had 
never been completed. Even where the safety of the predicate device 
had been evaluated, a 510(k) applicant was not required to submit 
data establishing that the new device is safe and effective.73 
The legal and medical literatures have focused extensively on 
how and to what extent this porous border between the 510(k) and 
PMA pathways might compromise device safety in an effort to 
sustain innovation and access. But for devices evaluated through the 
PMA process, the MDA created a formally rigorous framework of 
premarket review. The next three sections examine ways in which 
Congress and the FDA have, both formally and in practice, tipped 
the balance away from the MDA’s priority of assuring device safety. 
B. The Least Burdensome Approach: Relying on Unreliable Data 
The FDA Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA) required the 
FDA to employ the “least burdensome” approach to regulating 
devices submitted through the PMA and 510(k) processes.74 This 
statutory provision, and the FDA’s implementation of it, could have 
far-reaching, detrimental effects on the Agency’s premarket safety 
evaluation. Applying the least burdensome principle, the FDA has 
refrained from exercising its authority to require clinical data when 
evaluating 510(k) devices and has accepted less-than-rigorous data 
when evaluating PMA devices. 
The Safe Medical Device Act of 1990 (SMDA) had granted the 
FDA authority to “request additional information,” including 
clinical data, when conducting a 510(k) review.75  The FDA asserts 
the authority to review “‘all available safety and effectiveness 
information available for the medical device.”76 But the FDA’s own 
 
route”); Zuckerman et al., supra note 9, at 1009 (criticizing the FDA for “not fully 
implementing the law that requires high-risk medical devices to be approved through the PMA 
process and frequently us[ing] the 510(k) process instead”). 
 73. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 522 U.S. 312, 317 (2008). 
 74. 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c(a)(3)(D)(ii), (i)(1)(D)(i) (2012); Hall & Mercer, supra note 56, 
at 750. 
 75. Hall & Mercer, supra note 56, at 748–49, 776. Hall and Mercer argue that these 
and other changes converted the 510(k) process into one which provides a robust assessment 
of device safety. Id. at 750. 
 76. Id. at 776. 
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guidance documents that describe its implementation of the least 
burdensome principle state that the agency will only rarely review the 
safety data that the manufacturer possesses: “ODE reviewers 
normally should accept” a manufacturer’s declaration that its device 
meets the relevant 510(k) requirements, and “normally should not 
require the submission of information demonstrating conformity 
with the standard.”77 
Although much of the literature examining the PMA and the 
510(k) approval processes has assumed that the PMA process 
represents the gold standard for establishing device safety,78 the 
FDA’s implementation of the least burdensome principle has also 
impacted the formally rigorous design of the PMA process.79 In a 
guidance document originally released in 2002, the Agency outlined 
its view that the principle required it to approve high-risk devices 
based on studies that employed less-than-rigorous protocols. These 
included studies that did not directly compare treatment and non-
treatment groups, and studies that were analyzed using alternative 
statistical methods.80 Further, the guidance noted that the FDA 
would accept studies that utilized “surrogate endpoints,” that is, 
outcomes other than the clinical outcome the device was supposed 
to achieve.81 
 
 77. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., USE OF STANDARDS IN SUBSTANTIAL EQUIVALENCE 
DETERMINATIONS 6 (2000), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/Device 
RegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/ucm073756.pdf. 
 78. Benjamin N. Rome et al., FDA Approval of Cardiac Implantable Electronic Devices 
via Original and Supplement Premarket Approval Pathways, 1979-2012, 311 J. AM. MED. 
ASS’N 385, 390 (2014) (“The PMA process supporting FDA approval has long been 
considered the gold standard for rigorously establishing the safety and effectiveness of high-risk 
medical devices.”); see also Hines et al., supra note 16, at 6 (recommending statutory changes 
aimed at eliminating the permissive approach of the 510(k) pathway to technological 
differences and “steering such devices toward the PMA route”); Zuckerman et al., supra note 
9 at 1009 (criticizing the FDA for “not fully implementing the law that requires high-risk 
medical devices to be approved through the PMA process and frequently us[ing] the 510(k) 
process instead”). 
 79. See LEAST BURDENSOME PROVISIONS, supra note 15 at 3–4. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 4. See also FDA Facts: Biomarkers and Surrogate Endpoints, U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Innovation/ucm512503.htm (last updated 
July 21, 2017). For a comparison of the rigorous clinical trial requirements for new drug 
applications, see 21 C.F.R. § 314.126(b) (2017). This regulation defines “adequate and well-
controlled” studies as those that have a clearly-stated, predefined protocol, control of all 
relevant variables, comparison of treatment to placebo, blinding of participants and 
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Work by academic medical researchers has demonstrated how 
widespread the FDA’s reliance on less-than-rigorous data has 
become.82 One study found that nearly two-thirds of original PMA 
approvals for cardiovascular devices had been granted on the basis of 
a single study.83 This and another study of cardiovascular devices 
concluded that premarket approval “by the FDA is often based on 
studies that lack adequate strength and may be prone to bias.”84 Few 
(27%) of the studies examined were randomized and fewer (14%) 
were blinded.85 Many were poorly designed and did not adequately 
control for the relevant variables.86 The majority of studies (88%) 
used “surrogate end points” to assess device safety and efficacy.87 
Thus, most device approvals were granted on the basis of studies that 
never examined the actual effects for which the device was to be 
marketed. And many of these studies were flawed in other ways—
 
investigators, and randomized assignment to treatment or placebo. Id. Other methodologies, 
such as the use of historical controls, are disfavored. Id. 
 82. See Rome et al., supra note 78. 
 83. Sanket S. Dhruva et al., Strength of Study Evidence Examined by the FDA in 
Premarket Approval of Cardiovascular Devices, 302 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2679, 2684 (2009). By 
contrast, the new drug application (NDA) process, which the PMA process was designed to 
emulate, Hall & Mercer, supra note 56, at 747, typically requires at least two clinical studies, 
Hines et al., supra note 16, at 2. 
 84. Dhruva et al., supra note 83, at 2679; Daniel B. Kramer et al., Premarket Clinical 
Evaluation of Novel Cardiovascular Devices: Quality Analysis of Premarket Clinical Studies 
Submitted to the Food and Drug Administration 2000–2007, 17 AM. J. THERAPEUTICS 2, 4–
6 (2010). 
 85. Dhruva et al., supra note 83, at 2680. “Blinding” prevents study subjects’ and 
investigators’ knowledge from influencing the outcome. “Single-blind” studies are those in 
which subjects do not know if they are receiving the treatment under study or a placebo. 
Without blinding, subjects who know they are in the active treatment group are more likely to 
report improvement than those in the placebo-treated group. In “double-blind” studies, 
neither the subjects nor the investigators know whether each subject’s treatment is real or 
placebo. This prevents the investigators’ knowledge, and potential desire for a particular 
outcome, from influencing the study outcome. Blinding is often considered impossible in 
studies involving devices. For example, the only way to blind patients and investigators in a 
study of an implanted device would be to perform a “sham” surgery in the control group. 
 86. Kramer et al., supra note 84, at 4. 
 87. Dhruva et al., supra note 83, at 2682. The FDA currently notes that “endpoints 
denoting clinical benefit are usually measured directly, but in some cases may be demonstrated 
by use of validated surrogate endpoints.” U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR 
INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF: FACTORS TO CONSIDER WHEN 
MAKING BENEFIT-RISK DETERMINATIONS IN MEDICAL DEVICE PREMARKET APPROVAL AND 
DE NOVO CLASSIFICATIONS 8 (2016), http://www.fda.gov/ucm/groups/fdagov-public/@ 
fdagov-meddev-gen/documents/document/ucm517504.pdf. 
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they were of short duration, contained discrepancies in the numbers 
of patients enrolled and reported, and used “post hoc” data 
analyses.88 In sum, “[p]oorly defined safety and effectiveness end 
points, poor patient accounting, and incomplete collection of 
important patient comorbidities make device safety and effectiveness 
assessments more challenging.”89 
Two other groups that examined larger sets of Class III devices 
(not limited to cardiovascular devices) found similar problems. Vinay 
Rathi and colleagues at the Yale Medical School studied twenty-eight 
devices for which the FDA granted an original PMA approval in 
2010 and 2011, finding that many relied on a single pivotal study, 
failed to use a blinding protocol, and did not include a comparator 
group.90 They also noted that all of the pivotal studies had been 
funded by the device industry.91 Another group discussed examples 
of device approvals based on poorly designed research protocols that 
were possible because “for devices, the regulations permit ‘reliance 
upon other valid scientific evidence . . . even in the absence of well-
controlled investigations.’”92 
Thus, in spite of a formally demanding and thorough PMA 
review process, the FDA, implementing the least burdensome 
 
 88. Dhruva et al., supra note 83, at 2683. Problems that develop after a few years are 
unlikely to be detected by a study that follows subjects for six months. The problem with 
discrepancies between the numbers of subjects enrolled and the number reported is that the 
unreported subjects’ data could completely change the study results: A study that enrolled 100 
patients, reported data on 90, and found no adverse events in those 90 might be interpreted to 
show that a device is safe. However, if the 10 patients whose data was not reported suffered 
significant harm from the device, an adverse event rate of 10%—likely enough to preclude 
approval—goes undetected. “Post hoc” data analysis refers to analyses that were not planned in 
advance. The risk here is that the study design may not have been sufficient to ensure that all 
relevant variables were controlled for and that investigators may “slice and dice” the data to 
get the desired outcome. 
 89. Kramer et al., supra note 84, at 2. 
 90. Vinay K. Rathi et al., Characteristics of Clinical Studies Conducted Over the Total 
Product Life Cycle of High-Risk Therapeutic Medical Devices Receiving FDA Premarket 
Approval in 2010 and 2011, 314 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 604, 607–08 (2015). 
 91. Id. at 608. 
 92. Hines et al., supra note 16, at 2. Hines presented the example of a “vagus nerve 
stimulator (VNS), a surgically implanted device for treatment-resistant depression.” Id. Only 
one rigorous, randomized controlled trial had been conducted, and it had failed to 
demonstrate an improvement. Id. The FDA granted PMA approval on the basis of a non-
blinded follow up that compared VNS-treated patients with other patients who were enrolled 
at different times and who received other treatments as well. Id. 
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principle, has frequently approved Class III medical devices based on 
limited and low-quality data. Some of these compromises are 
inescapable in device evaluations. Conducting randomized, double-
blinded studies is sometimes impossible for medical devices.93 
Especially for implanted devices, a double-blind study would require 
the surgical implantation of a sham device, an ethically unacceptable 
procedure. But as it has implemented the least burdensome 
principle, the FDA has granted PMA approvals based on less-than-
rigorous data, potentially compromising the balance between device 
safety and innovation/access.94 
C. PMA Supplements and Iterative Device Modification 
Medical device development is often iterative, occurring in small, 
evolutionary (as opposed to large, revolutionary) steps. A 
requirement that manufacturers submit a new PMA application, 
complete with clinical studies and thousands of pages of 
documentation, for a modified version of an approved device would 
maximize device safety but would also impede the iterative model of 
device development. To balance safety with innovation and access, 
FDAMA created a number of abbreviated “PMA Supplement” 
processes through which manufacturers may gain approval for 
relatively minor modifications to their PMA-approved devices 
without a full PMA evaluation.95 The Medical Device User Fee 
and  Modernization Act of 2002 (MDUFMA) added several 
additional  categories of supplemental PMAs that allow for more 
significant  modifications.96 
 
 93. Dhruva et al., supra note 83, at 2683. 
 94. Id. at 2684. 
 95. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 
105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.); 21 C.F.R. § 814.39 
(2002) (allowing manufacturers to make changes in device labeling, indications for use, and 
manufacturing site or processes, and “changes in the performance or design specifications, 
circuits, components, ingredients, principles of operation, or physical layout of the device,” 
among other reasons). 
 96. Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-250, 
116 Stat. 1588 (codified in several provisions of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act); U.S. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FDA STAFF: MODIFICATIONS TO 
DEVICES SUBJECT TO PREMARKET APPROVAL (PMA) - THE PMA SUPPLEMENT DECISION-
MAKING PROCESS 2 n.2 (2008), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices
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The supplemental categories now available to manufacturers can 
be divided into two groups. The first are those indicated for 
significant modifications. Panel Track Supplements are indicated for 
modifications that result in “a significant change in design or 
performance of the device, or a new indication for use of the device, 
and for which substantial clinical data are necessary to provide a 
reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness.”97 Panel Track 
Supplements require the submission of “substantive clinical data.”98 
And 180-Day Supplements are indicated for modifications involving 
“a significant change in components, materials, design, specification, 
software, color additives, or labeling.”99 Typically, “only new 
preclinical testing is needed to demonstrate reasonable assurance of 
safety and effectiveness of the modified device.”100 The second group 
consists of supplemental processes indicated for minor design and 
labelling modifications.101 These include Real-Time Supplements and 
 
/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/UCM270606.pdf [hereinafter FDA 
2008 GUIDANCE]. 
 97. FDA 2008 GUIDANCE, supra note 96, at 7–11 (citing as examples the request for 
approval of an additional indication—and a new patient population—for a ventricular assist 
device which had originally been approved only for patients awaiting a heart transplant, adding 
patients who were not transplant candidates; the request for approval of a new surgical usage of 
a laser originally used to reshape the outer surface of the cornea to correct poor vision, adding 
a surgical usage to cut the cornea and then reshape the cornea’s inner surface; and a request for 
approval for use an artificial heart valve originally approved for use in the aortic position, for 
use in the mitral position). 
 98. Id. at 7. 
 99. Id. at 11–14 (citing as examples changes in the way the material used in aortic stent 
was woven together, and changes in the power supply of a ventricular assist device from 
compressed air to electricity). 
 100.  Id. at 11 (citing as examples changes in the way the material used in aortic stent was 
woven together, and changes in the power supply of a ventricular assist device from 
compressed air to electricity). 
 101.  Real-Time Supplements are indicated for “minor change[s] to the design of the 
device, software, sterilization, or labeling.” Id. at 15–17 (citing as examples changes to the 
circuitry controlling a ventricular assist device’s battery usage, the sterilization procedure used 
for cardiac ablation catheters, and the method of bonding a balloon to the catheter in a 
transurethral microwave ablation system). Typically, these applications are supported only by 
bench testing or testing done by the methodologies of a single scientific field. Id. 
Manufacturing Site Change Notices are indicated for a change to the “facility or establishment 
to manufacture, process, or package the device.” Id. at 21. Changes-Being Effected are used 
when a manufacturer first learns of information about device safety that was not previously 
submitted to the FDA, and which prompts “labeling changes that add or strengthen a 
contraindication, warning, precaution, or information about an adverse reaction for which 
there is reasonable evidence of a causal association.” Id. at 17. Finally, 30-Day Notices (which 
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Manufacturing Site Change Notices. For minor changes to 
manufacturing processes, the 30-Day Notice process allows a 
manufacturer to inform the FDA of relatively trivial changes and 
begin marketing the device using the new process thirty days later.102 
Only limited data is necessary to support a PMA Supplement: 
the manufacturer must present only data related to the specific 
changes being made.103 Clinical data about the safety of the modified 
device is often not required.104 The underlying assumption is that the 
overall safety of a modified device is evaluated in steps, with an 
initial, complete assessment including full clinical trial data at the 
time of an original PMA application and a limited assessment at the 
time of each PMA Supplement application. This cumulative 
assessment process reduces the burden on a manufacturer: by 
allowing manufacturers to rely on previously submitted data 
concerning aspects of a device that have not been directly 
modified,105 the process permits modifications without large new 
studies and duplicative paperwork. 
But this process carries a risk: a change to one component of a 
complex device may have unpredictable effects on the functioning of 
the device as a whole, which limited testing may fail to disclose. 
Although a full consideration of the field of complexity is beyond the 
scope of this article, it is useful to flag two kinds of complexity that 
are relevant. “Connectivity complexity” refers to “the number of 
 
are not considered a Supplemental PMA application) permit “a PMA applicant to submit 
written notification to the agency of a modification to the manufacturing procedure or method 
of manufacture affecting the safety and effectiveness of the device rather than submitting such 
change as a PMA supplement.” Id. at 19. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Guidance for Industry - Supplements to Approved Applications for Class III Medical 
Devices: Use of Published Literature, Use of Previously Submitted Materials, and Priority Review, 
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (May 20, 1998), http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/ 
Guidances/ucm080183.htm (“The abbreviated regulatory requirements for PMA 
supplemental applications are established under 21 C.F.R. § 814.39(c), which states that ‘all 
procedures and actions that apply to an application under Sec. 814.20 also apply to PMA 
supplements except that the information required in a supplement is limited to that needed to 
support the change.’”). 
 104.  Id. (“Nonclinical data may be sufficient to demonstrate that the design/product 
modification creates the intended additional capacity, function, or performance of the device. 
The new provision clarifies, however, that FDA may require, when necessary, additional clinical 
data to evaluate the modification of the device to provide a reasonable assurance of safety 
and effectiveness.”). 
 105.  Id. 
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relations/interconnections between the components of a given 
system.”106 Some medical devices incorporate a large number of 
components that are closely related in space and through multiple 
connections. As connectivity complexity increases, a change to one 
component becomes more likely to change the function of the 
whole.107 “User complexity” refers to the cognitive demands placed 
on a managing health care provider or a device user.108 Some devices 
are fully-automated, thus placing minimal demands and allowing few 
opportunities for human error. Other devices require a great deal of 
sophistication and training.109 A small change to a single component 
can have unpredictable effects on both the device function and the 
possibility for user error. 
There are currently no limits on how many times a manufacturer 
may modify a PMA-approved device through the use of PMA 
supplements. This iterative process, with only a limited safety 
assessment performed for each modification, magnifies the risk that 
complex interactions between device components or between the 
device and its users may not be completely understood because the 
safety evaluation required for a PMA Supplement is limited. 
Commentators have raised related concerns that the 510(k) 
pathway, which permits iterative changes to a device without an 
assessment of safety, has compromised device safety through 
“predicate creep.”110 The MDA permits 510(k) clearance for devices 
incorporating “significant change[s] in the materials, design, energy 
source, or other features of the device from those of the predicate 
device.”111 Thus, a new device (“D1”) may be approved despite 
having significant differences from its predicate device (“D0”). 
 
 106.  J.W. Senders, On the Complexity of Medical Devices and Systems, 15 QUALITY & 
SAFETY HEALTH CARE i41, i42 (2006). 
 107.  Id. at i42–i43. 
 108.  See id. at i41. 
 109.  See CLIA Categorizations, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/ 
MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/IVDRegulatoryAssistance/ucm393229.htm 
(last updated Apr. 16, 2014) (categorizing clinical laboratory testing devices based on, inter 
alia, the amount of knowledge and training required by users and the degree of automation). 
 110.  See INST. OF MED., MEDICAL DEVICES AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH: THE FDA 
510(K) CLEARANCE PROCESS AT 35 YEARS 89 (2011); Hines et al., supra note 16, at 4. 
 111.  21 U.S.C. §§ 360c(i)(1)(A)(ii), (B) (2012). The FDCA does require that the 
technological changes “not raise different questions of safety and effectiveness than the 
predicate device.” Id. § 360c(i)(A)(ii). 
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Predicate drift arises because of iterative 510(k) approvals: a newer 
device (“D2”) can be approved based on substantial equivalence to 
D1 in spite of technological differences between D1 and D2. Through 
dozens of iterations, device D25 or D50 may incorporate technology 
that is radically different from the original predicate device, D0. Even 
if D0 had been subjected to a thorough safety evaluation, which is 
frequently not the case because many original predicates were pre-
amendment devices, D25 or D50 have not.112 
The academic medical literature has raised the concern that 
repeated device modification through the PMA Supplement 
pathways may similarly compromise device safety. Ben Rome and 
colleagues found that the seventy-seven cardiovascular devices that 
received original PMA approval between 1979 and 2012 had been 
modified through a total of 5829 supplements, with a median of 50 
supplements per original device.113 They noted that “clinical data are 
rarely collected as part of PMA supplement applications prior to 
marketing.”114 They raised the concern that through iterative PMA 
supplements “minor design changes may accumulate over time and 
in some cases may add up to substantial changes from the device 
approved in the original PMA application.”115 
An example of this analog to predicate creep is provided by the 
evolution of one complex device over a fifteen-year period. The FDA 
granted an original PMA approval to Medtronic for its Transvene 
defibrillator lead system in 1993.116 The original Transvene lead had 
a diameter of 3.3 to 4 mm, polyurethane insulation, and a co-axial 
design in which three conducting wires ran the length of the lead 
 
 112.  See Hines et al., supra note 16, at 4 (providing the example of “a screening test for 
illicit drugs [that] ultimately allowed for the clearance of a malignancy diagnostic test,” after 
several 510(k) iterations, all without safety vetting); William H. Maisel, Premarket 
Notification: Analysis of FDA Recall Data 30 (July 28, 2010) (unpublished presentation), 
http://iom.nationalacademies.org/~/media/Files/Activity%20Files/PublicHealth/510kProc
ess/2010-JUL-28/05%20Maisel.pdf (concluding that a large number of predicates was 
correlated with an increased risk of recall). 
 113.  Rome et al., supra note 78, at 387. 
 114.  Id. at 389. 
 115.  Id. at 390. 
 116.  Premarket Approval (PMA), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.accessdata
.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfpma/pma.cfm?id=P920015 (last updated Jan. 8, 2018) 
[hereinafter Premarket Approval]. A defibrillator lead conducts electrical signals from a 
patient’s heart to a defibrillator implanted under the skin over the chest, and conducts a large 
shock from the defibrillator to the heart if the heart develops a dangerous arrhythmia. 
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wound concentrically around a central hollow core.117 By late 2007, 
Medtronic had submitted thirty-eight supplemental PMA 
applications, of which the FDA had granted thirty-three.118 The lead, 
by then marketed as the Sprint Fidelis, contained as many as six 
conductors.119 Instead of a co-axial design, the lead utilized a 
multilumen design in which each conductor was tightly wound 
around its own core, each running parallel to the others.120 The 
insulation incorporated both silicone and polyurethane.121 And the 
diameter of the lead was markedly smaller at 2.2 mm.122 Even if each 
of these individual changes—and others not discussed here—did not 
adversely affect the safety of the lead, the combination may have.123 
In October 2007, the FDA announced a Class 1 recall because the 
lead was exhibiting an unacceptably high failure rate.124 
Rome and colleagues raised an important question: When should 
manufacturers be required to submit device modifications—
regardless of how seemingly minor—through an original PMA 
 
 117.  Robert G. Hauser, A Better Method for Preventing Adverse Clinical Events Caused 
by Implantable Cardioverter-Defibrillator Lead Fractures?, 118 CIRCULATION 2117, 
2117 (2008). 
 118.  See Premarket Approval, supra note 116. This webpage lists the basic information 
for the original PMA approval and the Supplemental PMA applications granted by the FDA. 
As of October 25, 2007, the date of the Fidelis recall, Medtronic had submitted thirty-eight 
Supplemental PMA applications. See id. (follow link to S038 (application submitted Sept. 12, 
2007, approved Feb. 6, 2008)). As of October 25, 2007, the FDA had approved thirty-five 
Supplemental PMA applications. See id. (follow link to S035 (application approved Nov. 7, 
2006)). No FDA action is listed for Supplemental PMA applications number 18 and 19. Id. 
 119.  See KENNETH A. ELLENBOGEN ET AL., CLINICAL CARDIAC PACING, 
DEFIBRILLATION, AND RESYNCHRONIZATION 174 (3d ed. 2007); Joshua D. Lovelock et al., 
ICD Leads Prone to Failure: Weighing the Risks at the Time of Pulse Generator Exchange, 4 J. 
INNOVATIONS CARDIAC RHYTHM MGMT. 1108, 1109 (2013); Charles D. Swerdlow & 
Kenneth A. Ellenbogen, Implantable Cardioverter-Defibrillator Leads: Design, Diagnostics, and 
Management, 128 CIRCULATION 2062 (2013). 
 120.  See ELLENBOGEN ET AL., supra note 119, at 174. 
 121.  Robert G. Hauser et al., Early Failure of a Small-Diameter High-Voltage 
Implantable Cardioverter-Defibrillator Lead, 4 HEART RHYTHM 892, 892–93 (2007). 
 122.  See ELLENBOGEN ET AL., supra note 119, at 174. 
 123.  Christopher M. Janson et al., Implantable Cardioverter-Defibrillator Lead Failure 
in Children and Young Adults: A Matter of Lead Diameter or Lead Design?, 63 J. AM. C. 
CARDIOL. 133, 136 (2014). 
 124.  Medical Device Recalls, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https:// www.accessdata.fda
.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfres/res.cfm (input October 25, 2007 into the “Recall Date” 
fields, and narrow the “Recall Class” to “Class 1”) (last updated Jan. 5, 2018) [hereinafter 
Medical Device Recalls]. 
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application?125 Stated in another way, when should the FDA evaluate 
a modified device as though it were a new device? According to the 
FDA guidance, a new device is one in which the  
design [is] so different from the original version that the pre-
clinical . . . and clinical data . . . previously submitted on [the] orig-
inal device are not applicable (i.e., not supportive) for the specific 
change in demonstrating a reasonable assurance of the safety and 
effectiveness of the modified  device.126  
But determining the overall effect of any small change on a complex 
system is difficult. And determining the overall effect of repeated 
small changes is vastly more difficult. Thus, the availability of PMA 
Supplement pathways as means by which manufacturers can 
iteratively and extensively modify high-risk devices carries the 
potential to compromise device safety. 
D. The 21st Century Cures Act: Potential to Worsen both Problems 
The recently-enacted 21st Century Cures Act has the potential 
to exacerbate the data insufficiencies outlined in section II.B and 
section II.C of this Article. Section 3058 of the Act emphasizes the 
least burdensome approach, proscribing the FDA from demanding 
more than “the minimum required information that . . . provides a 
reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness of the device.”127 
Further, for “Breakthrough Devices,” the FDA is permitted to 
“facilitate, when scientifically appropriate, expedited and efficient 
development and review of the device through utilization of timely 
postmarket data collection,” thus minimizing premarket data 
requirements.128 And for other Class III medical devices, this shift to 
post-market data is emphasized: “[T]he Secretary shall consider the 
role of postmarket information in determining the least burdensome 
 
 125.  Rome et al., supra note 78, at 390. 
 126.  FDA 2008 GUIDANCE, supra note 96, at 5 (footnotes omitted). 
 127.  21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 3058(a), 130 Stat. 1033, 1129 
(2016) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)) (requiring training for every FDA employee who is 
involved in the premarket assessment of medical devices and including the medical device 
industry in periodic audits of how well the Agency is implementing this approach). 
 128.  Id. § 3051 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360e–3) (emphasis added). 
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means of demonstrating a reasonable assurance of device safety 
and  effectiveness.”129 
The problem with relying on post-market studies and data is that 
under this approach the entire population is enlisted as a study 
group. Newly-approved devices are often used in large numbers of 
patients in a very short time. The Sprint Fidelis lead was implanted 
into 268,000 patients within three years of approval.130 It was only 
then—after hundreds of thousands of patients had received these 
leads—that the increased risk of failure was detected. A premarket 
study that required longer follow up would have detected this 
problem.131 Reliance on post-market data collection is not sufficient 
to prevent widespread harm—by the time data is collected and 
analyzed, the failures and harms will already have occurred. The 
emphasis on the least burdensome approach and the shifting of data 
production burdens to the post-market period may impact the 
evaluation of both new and supplemental PMA applications. 
 
* * * 
 
Consumers, manufacturers, and Congress constantly pressure the 
FDA to tip the scales in favor of permitting innovation and access, 
often at risk of compromising its mission of assuring device safety. At 
a minimum, these pressures suggest that we should closely evaluate 
how well the PMA process functions to ensure the safety of the most 
high-risk devices sold in the United States. The next Part examines 
the available empirical studies that might shed light on how well the 
balance has been struck. 
 
 129.  Id. § 3058(b) (emphasis added). 
 130.  Dhruva et al., supra note 83, at 2684. 
 131.  The Sprint Fidelis lead failure rate currently stands at approximately 20%. CRHF 
Product Performance: 6949 Sprint Fidelis, MEDTRONIC, http://wwwp.medtronic.com
/productperformance/model/6949-sprint-fidelis.html (last updated July 31, 2017). A study 
involving a few thousand subjects followed for three years, at which time the failure rate was 
6.5% (which is significantly higher than other leads), could have found this problem, exposing 
far fewer individuals to harm. 
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III. THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE ON DEVICE SAFETY 
FOLLOWING PMA REVIEW 
Most empirical work on device safety has focused on devices 
cleared by the 510(k) pathway.132 Of the studies that did examine 
PMA-approved device failures, several did not report the number of 
devices that were at risk of failure, making it impossible to determine 
the proportion of approved devices that failed and, thus, how reliably 
the PMA pathway functions.133 In this Part, I first describe the proxy 
that all studies of device safety have used to highlight the limitations 
of these studies. Then I review the few studies that have calculated 
the risk that the PMA process fails to ensure the safety of high-risk 
devices.134 These studies provide no definitive answers, but they do 
form a starting point for the study I present in Part IV. 
A. FDA-Classified Class 1 Recalls: A Proxy for Failure of the PMA 
Process to Detect Problems 
An optimal assessment of how well FDA premarket evaluation 
serves to ensure device safety would directly identify device failures 
from an accurate and comprehensive source, determine how many of 
these failures were systematic (as opposed to sporadic), and calculate 
the ratio of devices that exhibited significant systematic failures to 
the number of devices at risk of failure. But in spite of mandatory 
reporting requirements, device failures most often go unreported.135 
Even where failures are reported, the available databases in which 
reports are collected are not easily searchable. Further, the poor 
quality of the reports in those databases often makes determining the 
 
 132.  See Zhivko Bliznakov et al., Analysis and Classification of Medical Device Recalls, 14 
INT’L FED’N FOR MED. & BIOLOGICAL ENGINEERING PROC. 3782 (2006); Marta L. 
Villarraga et al., Medical Device Recalls from 2004 to 2006: A Focus on Class I Recalls, 62 FOOD 
& DRUG L.J. 581 (2007). 
 133.  See, e.g., Zuckerman et al., supra note 9. 
 134.  I will not discuss here studies that did not distinguish recalls of PMA approved 
from 510(k) cleared devices, including those mentioned supra, note 132. 
 135.  See James R. Ward & P. John Clarkson, An Analysis of Medical Device-Related 
Errors: Prevalence and Possible Solutions, 28 J. MED. ENGINEERING & TECH. 1, 5 (2009) 
(describing underreporting rates for device-related medical errors ranging from 10 to 80%); 
Hearings, supra note 20, at 11 (statement of Frederic S. Resnic) (citing GAO estimate that 
only 0.5% of medical device adverse events are reported to the FDA). 
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root cause and even the seriousness of the failure impossible.136 And 
because manufacturers change the names under which they sell their 
devices after often-trivial modifications, examining individual reports 
may fail to detect patterns arising from systematic failures of a single 
technology that is sold as several apparently distinct devices. Rather 
than attempt to overcome these obstacles, researchers have relied on 
FDA-classified recalls as a proxy for device failures. 
A “recall” is an action, typically initiated by a manufacturer, for 
the “removal or correction of a marketed product that the Food and 
Drug Administration considers to be in violation of the laws it 
administers.”137 Where the FDA determines that there is a 
“reasonable probability” that a device failure “will cause serious 
adverse health consequences or death,”138 it may classify the action as 
a “Class 1” recall.139 For a situation in which a product “is unlikely 
to cause adverse health consequences,” the Agency may classify the 
action as a “Class 3” recall.140 “Class 2” recalls form the middle 
ground, in which device failures “may cause temporary or medically 
reversible adverse health consequences or where the probability of 
serious adverse health consequences is remote.”141 Since November 
1, 2002, all FDA-classified recalls (including firm-initiated and FDA-
ordered) have been recorded in a publicly-accessible, easily 
 
 136.  See Hearings, supra note 20, at 23 (testimony of William Maisel) (“[T]he adverse 
event reports we get are cryptic and don’t contain enough information.”). 
 137.  21 C.F.R. §§ 7.3, 810.2(k) (2017). Most recalls are initiated by the manufacturer. 
JOHNSON 2016, supra note 28, at 39. A manufacturer must report to the FDA the “[r]eason 
for the removal or correction and . . . [the manufacturer’s e]valuation of the risk associated.” 
21 C.F.R. § 7.46(a). The MDA requires the FDA first to order the manufacturer to cease 
distribution of the device and to notify health professionals and facilities of the order. The 
manufacturer may request a hearing to be held within ten days of the order. If, after the 
hearing, the FDA still finds cause, it must amend the original order to include the recall of the 
device. 21 U.S.C. § 360h(e) (2012). The FDA may also order a manufacturer to initiate a 
recall. 21 C.F.R. § 810.13; see also Recalls, Corrections & Removals (Devices), U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/postma 
rketrequirements/recallscorrectionsandremovals/default.htm (last updated Aug. 25, 2017). 
 138.  Industry Guidance: Recalls Background and Definitions, U.S. FOOD 
&  DRUG  ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/IndustryGuidance/ucm129337.htm 
(last updated Aug. 22, 2014) [hereinafter Industry Guidance]. 
 139.  21 C.F.R. § 7.3(m)(1). 
 140.  Id. § 7.3(m)(3). 
 141.  Id. § 7.3(m)(2). 
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searchable database.142 Most investigators have elected to use only 
Class 1 recalls as a proxy for device failure. 
This choice has distinct benefits. Using the FDA’s classification 
removes one level of subjectivity from the analysis because 
investigators’ decisions about which failures are significant are made 
by the FDA. Other than manufacturers, who might be reluctant to 
divulge information about device failures, the FDA is in the best 
position to accumulate and offer access to this data. And restricting 
the analysis to Class 1 recalls, which the FDA considers to be 
appropriate for the most serious device failures, minimizes the risk of 
overestimating the rate of serious device failures. 
The choice also carries distinct drawbacks, which are largely 
mirror images of the benefits. The FDA’s assignment of recalls is 
based on overlapping categories: consequences that are “serious” are 
not mutually exclusive from those that are “temporary” or 
“reversible.” Thus, the FDA may classify a firm-initiated action as a 
Class 2 recall for a serious, even life-threatening, failure that also 
happens to be temporary or reversible.143 Relying on the FDA’s 
classification of recalls merely shifts the subjectivity to the FDA. 
Further, in attempting to define the risk that a premarket assessment 
failed to detect serious device flaws, some kinds of failures that are 
properly classified as Class 2 recalls are relevant. Temporary or 
reversible consequences may expose patients to threats to their lives, 
the need for corrective surgery, and many other problems.144 And 
because failures are underreported,145 manufacturers and the FDA 
almost certainly underestimate their true incidence. Ultimately, these 
drawbacks ensure that any study (including the one I present in Part 
IV) that relies solely on Class 1 recalls to identify serious device 
failures will underestimate the frequency of those failures, and hence 
will overestimate how well the PMA process functions to ensure 
device safety.146 Thus, in interpreting the findings of these studies it 
 
 142.  Medical Device Recalls, supra note 124. 
 143.  See infra notes 241–45 and accompanying text. 
 144.  See infra Part V. 
 145.  See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 146.  See infra Part V for a more complete discussion of the ramifications of the choice to 
use only Class 1 recalls in empirical studies of FDA premarket evaluation effectiveness. But see 
Hearings, supra note 20, at 87 (statement of Ralph F. Hall) (arguing that Class 2 recalls are 
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is important to recognize that they determine only a “best-case 
scenario” that defines the upper bound for how well FDA premarket 
assessments function to ensure device safety. 
B. Literature Review 
Four empirical studies have attempted to determine the 
frequency with which the FDA has classified firm-initiated or FDA-
ordered actions as Class 1 recalls for PMA-approved devices.147 
Three of these studies not only focused on the 510(k) pathway but 
also examined the PMA pathway for comparison. These studies, by 
Dr. John Somberg,148 Professor Ralph Hall,149 and the medical 
device industry trade organization AdvaMed,150 reported low rates of 
recall, ranging from 0.45 to 0.85%.151 
While a failure rate under one percent would seem to indicate 
that the PMA process functions well to ensure device safety, these 
studies considered only Class 1 recalls, which, as discussed in section 
II.A, supra, allows only for a determination of the best-case scenario. 
 
“for remote risks or low impact problems” and that even using Class 1 recalls includes many 
low-probability failures). 
 147.  See Daniel B. Kramer et al., How Does Medical Device Regulation Perform in the 
United States and the European Union?: A Systematic Review, PUB. LIBR. SCI. MED., July 
2012, at 1, for a review of the literature on this topic as of 2012. Other studies have reported 
numbers of failures without reporting the number of devices at risk. See, e.g., Zuckerman et al., 
supra note 9. 
 148.  John C. Somberg et al., Assessment of Cardiovascular and Noncardiovascular 
Medical Device Recalls, 113 AM. J. CARDIOLOGY 1899 (2014). 
 149.  Hearings, supra note 20, at 81 (statement of Ralph F. Hall). Professor Hall 
presented the results of a study of a study on FDA premarket device evaluation and subsequent 
Class 1 recalls to a congressional committee investigating the FDA’s 510(k) process. Hall 
reported that fewer than 0.5% of devices receiving PMA approval between 2005 and 2009 
were recalled during the study period. Id. 
 150.  BATTELLE MEMORIAL INST., 510(K) PREMARKET NOTIFICATION EVALUATION 
(2010), http://thehill.com/images/stories/blogs/battelle.pdf (study prepared for AdvaMed). 
 151.  Somberg examined recalls issued over an eight-year period. Somberg’s data 
included 249 recalls, 246 of which were Class 1. Somberg et al., supra note 148, at 1900. 
Given the very small number of Class 2 recalls, I consider this study to have examined only 
Class 1 recalls. Id. Professor Hall presented the results of a study on FDA premarket device 
evaluation and subsequent Class 1 recalls to a congressional committee investigating the FDA’s 
510(k) process. Hall reported that fewer than 0.5% of devices receiving PMA approval between 
2005 and 2009 were recalled during the study period. Hearings, supra note 20, at 82–83 
(statement of Ralph F. Hall) (concluding that over 99.5% of PMAs/PMA approved devices 
were not recalled). The AdvaMed study reported that the risk of Class 1 recall of a PMA-
approved device was 0.85%. BATTELLE MEMORIAL INST., supra note 150, at 4 tbl.1. 
1.HORVATH_FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/12/2018  10:34 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2017 
1022 
Beyond this, these studies all employed a methodology that leads to 
an even greater underestimation of the true risk of recall. The risk of 
recall is determined by the following ratio: 
 Devices Recalled During the Observation Period Devices at Risk of Being Recalled During the Observation Period 
 
The Somberg, Hall, and AdvaMed studies all counted the 
number of devices at risk (the denominator) in a way that biased the 
findings toward a lower calculated value. These studies inflated the 
denominator by considering certain types of PMA Supplements as 
creating unique devices at risk for recall. This problem is best 
understood if one were to consider a hypothetical study in which all 
original and all PMA Supplement approvals, including supplements 
for trivial changes to the packaging or labeling of devices, were 
counted as having created unique devices at risk of failure. A device 
marketed in three different packages or bearing one of three labels 
with insignificant differences should be counted as one, not three, 
devices for the purpose of determining the risk that the premarket 
safety evaluation had failed. But in the hypothetical, the denominator 
of the risk equation would count such a device as three different 
devices at risk. 
The Somberg and AdvaMed studies excluded trivial 
modifications, but counted each original PMA approval and each 
Panel-Track and 180-Day PMA Supplement approval as having 
created unique devices at risk of failure.152 Even this inclusion only of 
more significant modifications, however, leads to an artificially low 
calculated risk. Considering every modification approved by a Panel 
 
 152.  Based on the number of devices in the Somberg et al. study, the authors appear to 
have excluded 30-day supplements, which as above are used for the smallest of changes to 
device labelling and are not considered by the FDA as being supplemental PMAs. See generally 
Somberg et al., supra note 148. It is not clear whether they included Real Time, Changes 
Being Effected, and 135-Day supplements, but at least some of these may have been included. 
Somberg almost certainly included 180-Day and Panel Track supplements in the devices at risk 
total. The AdvaMed study used original PMA approvals, 180-day supplements, and panel-track 
supplements to calculate the total number of PMA-approved devices at risk. Hall did not 
specify his method for determining the denominator of the risk calculation. His methodology 
has been criticized for relying on an indirect estimate of the number of devices at risk, based on 
historical averages of the number of device approvals. Hearings, supra note 20, at 69 
(statement of Diana Zuckerman). 
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Track or 180-Day supplement as a new device is not consistent with 
the nature of the safety review conducted for PMA Supplement 
applications. As noted above, for PMA Supplement applications the 
FDA does not review the safety of the entire device. Rather, the FDA 
reviews only the changes the manufacturer is proposing to make to 
an existing device. The specific device that is marketed (assuming the 
application is approved) has not, by itself, been subjected to a 
comprehensive safety evaluation. Only the entire line of products 
extending back through every applicable supplement to the original 
PMA application has been subjected to a comprehensive safety 
evaluation. Treating a PMA Supplement approval as an approval to 
market a new, unique device with its own complete safety evaluation 
is thus inconsistent with the review process. 
Nor is this methodology consistent with Congress’s and the 
FDA’s approach. By statute, Congress established that PMA 
Supplements are to be used when a manufacturer makes “any change 
to a device subject to an approved application under this subsection 
that affects safety or effectiveness.”153 The FDA does not consider a 
supplemental PMA application as appropriate for a new device: FDA 
regulations define a PMA Supplement as an “application to an 
approved PMA for approval of a change or modification in a class III 
medical device.”154 Both Congress and the FDA thus consider a 
device evaluated through a PMA Supplement pathway as an 
originally-approved device that has been modified rather than a 
new device. 
A more suitable methodology for studying how well the FDA’s 
premarket evaluation process serves to ensure device safety would 
consider each new PMA approval and all significant supplements as 
creating a single device that has been modified over time and that 
has been subjected to a single, albeit segmented, safety assessment. 
Dr. Vinay Rathi and colleagues used such a methodology to study a 
subset of PMA-approved devices.155 Rathi counted only original 
PMA approvals as devices at risk in the denominator of the risk 
equation.156 Based on a small sample size, they calculated that 3.6% 
 
 153.  21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(6) (2012). 
 154.  21 C.F.R. § 814.3(g) (2017) (emphasis added); see also 21 C.F.R. § 814.39(a). 
 155.  Vinay K. Rathi et al., supra note 90, at 607. Rathi excluded non-therapeutic, 
typically diagnostic, devices from the study. Id. at 605. 
 156.  Id. at 607. 
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of devices that were PMA approved in 2010 and 2011 had a Class 1 
recall prior to June 2015.157 This suggests that the PMA pathway 
might fail to prevent flawed devices from reaching the market at a 
much higher rate than the studies by Somberg, Hall, and AdvaMed 
would indicate. 
These studies allow for an even more limited assessment of the 
factors that might underlie an increased risk of failure. One such 
factor is device age: devices that have been in use for a long time 
might be expected to fail more often as components deteriorate and 
latent problems become manifest. Somberg reported, however, that 
Class 1 recalls tended to occur early in the lifetime of a device: the 
majority of Class 1 recalls (71%) in that study occurred within the 
first three years of device approval.158 However, Somberg did not 
report how time on the market was calculated, limiting the 
interpretation of this finding.159  
Another factor that previous studies have examined is device 
type. Two studies considered whether the FDA review panel to 
which devices were assigned correlated with the risk of recall. In 
Somberg’s study, Cardiovascular devices did not appear to have a 
higher risk of a Class 1 recall (0.45% overall risk for all PMA 
approved devices and 0.48% for devices approved by the 
Cardiovascular panel).160 Hall’s study, by contrast, suggested that 
Cardiovascular and General Hospital devices accounted for most 
recalls, although Hall did not separate devices approved through the 
PMA pathway from those cleared through the 510(k) pathway.161 
No studies of which I am aware have sought to assess other factors 
that might contribute to an increased risk that a Class III device will 
exhibit a significant failure, including the number of times or rate at 
 
 157.  Id. at 605 n.19, 607. 
 158.  Somberg et al., supra note 148, at 1902. The investigators did not state whether 
their time on the market analysis used the interval from the original PMA approval to the 
recall, or the interval from the most recent supplemental PMA approval to the recall. 
 159.  If the period was calculated as extending from the most recent supplemental 
approval to the recall, the frequent granting of supplemental PMA approvals is likely to have 
biased the findings in favor of finding a short interval. On the other hand, if the period was 
calculated from the original PMA approval, the finding strongly suggests that failures are due 
to flaws already present at the time the device was manufactured. 
 160. Somberg et al., supra note 148, at 1900–01. 
 161.  Hearings, supra note 20, at 93 (statement of Ralph F. Hall). 
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which a manufacturer has modified its device through the PMA 
Supplement pathways. 
Because the scant empirical literature on the PMA process does 
not provide clear answers to these and other questions that are 
essential to understanding the impact of Congress’s and the FDA’s 
attempts to balance safety against innovation and access, I performed 
an empirical study of PMA-approved, Class III devices. I present this 
study in Part IV. 
IV. AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF PMA-APPROVED MEDICAL DEVICES 
A. Study Aims and Hypotheses 
The foregoing review of the available empirical literature shows 
that most questions relating to how well Congress and the FDA have 
struck the balance between assuring safety and assuring innovation 
and access remain unanswered. Foremost among these is the rate at 
which PMA evaluation of high-risk, Class III devices fails to prevent 
flawed devices that present the threat of death or serious harm from 
reaching the market. As discussed in Part III, the methodology that 
most investigators have used biases their findings toward lower-than-
actual values by considering each PMA Supplement as having created 
a new, distinct device. The only study that used an appropriate 
methodology examined only a very small number of devices for a 
relatively short time. Therefore, the primary aim of the present study 
was to determine the risk of Class 1 recall for as large a number of 
high-risk (Class III, PMA-approved) devices as could reliably 
be evaluated. 
In addition to determining the failure rate of PMA-approved 
devices, I sought to evaluate several hypotheses related to the 
concerns raised in Parts II and III of this Article. As discussed in Part 
II, the PMA Supplement pathways created by the FDA 
Modernization Act and the Medical Device User Fee and 
Modernization Act might compromise safety in a manner analogous 
to the predicate drift problem identified in devices cleared through 
the 510(k) pathway. Because the PMA Supplement process allows 
manufacturers to modify devices without presenting full safety data 
and clinical data, devices that are marketed after multiple 
supplements might not have been adequately vetted from a safety 
perspective. These devices may be more likely to fail, even if the 
originally approved device was safe. No prior study has examined 
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whether the iterative process of altering devices through PMA 
supplements impacts device safety. Therefore, I sought to test the 
hypothesis that: 
H1: An increased number of PMA Supplement approvals is 
associated with a higher likelihood of Class 1 recall.162 
Related to H1, I postulated that even if a manufacturer makes 
iterative modifications to a device, if those modifications are made at 
long intervals, the safety impact of each can be evaluated and 
subsequent PMA Supplements can incorporate additional changes 
that ensure safety. Conversely, where a manufacturer makes changes 
in short-order, it is unable to assess the safety ramifications of each. 
Therefore, I sought to investigate whether: 
H2: Shorter intervals between PMA Supplements is associated with 
a higher risk of Class 1 recall.163 
Based on the existing literature on the PMA process, I also 
sought to determine whether device age impacted the risk of failure. 
Devices might fail due to mechanical or other time-dependent 
modes of deterioration—for example, artificial joints might fail after 
years of use due to ordinary wear and tear. Conversely, devices might 
fail because of poor design features or manufacturing processes, in 
which case the failures would occur because of flaws that are already 
present when the device leaves the manufacturer. These devices 
might fail shortly after they are marketed. The only study to have 
addressed this question reported that devices that failed tended to do 
 
 162.  I pre-specified that comparisons to test hypothesis H1 would compare the risk of 
recall for devices in the upper quartile of supplements granted with the risk of all other devices. 
Because some supplement types are used solely for trivial or minor modifications, most 
investigators have not considered these supplements. See supra note 151 and accompanying 
text. Others have raised the concern that even trivial changes, when made in sufficient 
numbers, may compromise device safety. See supra notes 113–115 and accompanying text. I 
pre-specified two comparisons that address these issues. The first would compare the total 
number of supplements granted to an original PMA-approved device with the likelihood of 
recall, while the second would compare only supplements used for more significant changes 
(the total number of 180-Day and Panel-Track supplements, see supra Part II.C) with the 
likelihood of recall. 
 163.  I pre-specified that comparisons to test hypothesis H2 would compare the risk of 
recall for devices with the mean interval between supplements in the lowest quartile (i.e., those 
with the shortest intervals) with all other devices. 
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so within a few years of approval.164 However, that study may have 
been biased toward finding a shorter interval.165 Because older 
devices might fail because of time-dependent component breakdown 
and because safety practices may have improved over time, I 
hypothesized that 
H3: Longer time on the market correlates with the occurrence of 
Class 1 recalls. 
The type of device and its indicated uses might predict the risk of 
failure—devices that are used to treat certain problems might be 
more prone to fail or more likely to have their failures recognized. 
Somberg’s study reported that device type did not correlate with the 
risk of recall.166 In contrast, Hall’s study of 510(k)-cleared devices 
found that Cardiovascular and General Hospital devices had much 
higher failure rate than other devices.167 I hypothesized that the 
panel assignment would predict a Class 1 recall: 
H4: Assignment to the Cardiovascular and General Hospital Panels 
correlates with the occurrence of Class 1 recalls. 
I also generated several hypotheses de novo. Because implanted 
devices carry risks that non-implanted devices do not, such as 
infection and inflammatory reactions, I hypothesized that: 
H5: Classification as an Implanted Device correlates with the 
occurrence of Class 1 recalls. 
I also hypothesized that because failures of devices that are used 
to sustain lives will manifest more overtly, failures of these devices 
will be more rapidly identified and will trigger more aggressive FDA 
action. Thus, 
H6: Classification as a Life Sustaining Device correlates with the 
occurrence of Class 1 recalls. 
Finally, I postulated that a device that is the subject of a Class 1 
recall is more likely to have subsequent Class 1 recalls. Once a 
manufacturer has taken the necessary steps to complete a device 
 
 164.  Somberg et al., supra note 148, at 1902. 
 165.  See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
 166.  Somberg et al., supra note 148, at 1902. 
 167.  Hearings, supra note 20, at 93 (statement of Ralph F. Hall). 
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recall, the manufacturer may continue to manufacture and sell the 
device. Thus, simply because a device has been recalled once does 
not mean that it will not be recalled again. A device recall 
might  identify a technology that is so complex or a design or 
manufacturing process that is so inherently flawed as to continue to 
pose an increased risk in spite of a manufacturer’s corrective actions. 
On the other hand, the manufacturer’s corrective actions may 
eliminate the problem. None of the studies discussed here examined 
the impact of an initial Class 1 recall on the risk of a subsequent 
Class 1 recall.168 Thus, I hypothesized that: 
H7: Following a Class 1 recall, devices will have a higher risk of a 
second Class 1 recall compared with the risk that all devices have a 
first Class 1 recall. 
B. Methodology 
I used the FDA-maintained, publicly-accessible PMA database as 
the primary source of device-related data.169 The PMA database can 
be searched by individual device or device type, or downloaded in 
toto. The PMA database contains information about each original 
PMA, along with every PMA Supplement granted by the FDA. The 
file includes the submission and approval dates, the FDA’s 
assignment of product code,170 and the review panel for each PMA 
and PMA Supplement. For supplements, the file also contains the 
type of supplement (e.g., Panel-Track, 180-Day, Real Time). This 
database, which has served as a source of information that all 
previous investigators have used, is considered to contain complete 
 
 168.  Most studies fail to explicitly discuss how the investigators treated multiple Class 1 
recalls issued for a single device. See Hearings, supra note 20 (statement of Ralph D. Hall); 
BATTELLE MEMORIAL INST., supra note 150; Somberg et al., supra note 148. Rathi et al. 
included only the highest-risk recall in their data, eliminating consideration of repeated device 
recalls. See Rathi et al., supra note 90, at 605. 
 169. Premarket Approval, supra note 116. 
 170.  The FDA categorizes each PMA device using a three-letter Product Code at the 
time of approval. This code serves to group or subgroup similar devices. See Medical Device 
Classification Product Codes: Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Administration 
Staff,  U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Apr. 11, 2013), http://www.fda.gov/downloads
/medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/guidancedocuments/ucm285325.pdf. 
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and accurate information.171 I downloaded the entire PMA database, 
containing information on all original and supplemental PMAs 
granted through September 30, 2016. 
I obtained additional information about each PMA and PMA 
Supplement from the FDA’s Product Classification database.172 This 
database lists certain information associated with each product code, 
including the Agency’s classification of devices as implanted or non-
implanted, and as life-sustaining or non-life-sustaining. I combined 
the information in this database with that contained in the 
PMA database. 
I obtained data on Class 1 recalls from two sources.173 The first 
was the PMA database itself. When searched by individual PMA 
numbers, the original PMA web pages contain hyperlinked 
information on device recalls. The hyperlinks take a user to the FDA 
Recalls website,174 which contains information about all recalls for 
the individual device dating back to November 1, 2002. For each 
Class 1 recall entry, I extracted the date at which the manufacturer 
initiated the correction action that led to the recall, the date on 
which the FDA announced the recall, the manufacturer’s explanation 
for the recall, the FDA’s determination of the root cause, and the 
number of device units affected. I supplemented this data by 
downloading all Class 1 recall data directly from the FDA Device 
Recalls website. The device recall website contains information about 
all device recalls since November 1, 2002.175 I combined the recall 
 
 171.  Hearings, supra note 20, at 86 (statement of Ralph F. Hall); BATTELLE MEMORIAL 
INST., supra note 150, at 12; Rathi et al., supra note 90, at 605; Somberg et al., supra note 
148, at 1900. 
 172.  Product Classification, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.accessdata.fda
.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfpcd/classification.cfm (last visited Jan. 8, 2018). 
 173.  A word of explanation about my decision to rely on Class 1 recalls as a proxy for 
device failure is in order. Two reasons motivated this decision. First, using Class 1 recalls is 
consistent with nearly all prior studies of the safety of 510(k) cleared and PMA approved 
devices. By using Class 1 recalls, the findings of my study can be compared to the prior studies 
to ensure that my database is similar to those assembled by previous investigators. Second, 
although using Class 1 recalls will be underinclusive, using all Class 2 recalls would be 
drastically overinclusive because most Class 2 recalls will have been ordered for less 
serious  problems. 
 174.  Medical Device Results, supra note 124. 
 175.  See id. 
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information from the Device Recalls database with the data from the 
PMA database to create a master study database.176 
Throughout the history of the MDA, Congress has required and 
the FDA has been engaged in a process of re-evaluating device 
classification.177 Many devices that were first marketed after the 
enactment of the MDA were presumptively classified as Class III.178 
The FDA has reclassified some of these devices to Class I or Class 
II.179 Because reclassification of a Class III device to Class I or II 
reflects the FDA’s determination that these devices were not high 
risk, I excluded those devices from the data set. I maintained a 
separate data set for these devices, which was not used in the present 
study. I also excluded devices approved after November 1, 2015, to 
ensure that all devices had at least one year of observation. The study 
period was from November 1, 2002, to November 1, 2016.180 
The “Primary Data Set” used in this study consisted of all PMA-
approved Class III devices originally approved on or after November 
1, 2002. This date was selected because the data in the FDA’s 
Device Recalls database begins then. Devices approved prior to 
November 1, 2002, might have had Class 1 recalls that would not be 
included in any database.181 Further, devices approved decades ago 
 
 176.  Using the PMA database as the primary source of information about device recalls 
allowed me to circumvent one commonly cited difficulty confronted by several other 
investigators who instead used the Recall database as their primary source: The data contained 
in the FDA Recall database frequently does not contain the approval history for the recalled 
device. Because device names may change and several related technologies may be approved 
under different PMAs or even under a 510(k), an investigator starting from the Recalls 
database is forced to assign recalls to a given PMA. See BATTELLE MEMORIAL INST., supra note 
150, at 3; Somberg et al., supra note 148, at 1900 (using data from FDA’s medical device 
recalls website); Zuckerman et al., supra note 9, at 1007. These assignments often leave a 
residual uncertainty as to whether the correct approval type (510(k) or PMA) and device have 
been associated with the recall. See BATTELLE MEMORIAL INST., supra note 150, at 12–13. By 
using the PMA database as the primary source, I ensured that no 510(k) cleared devices were 
included in the study. 
 177.  See JOHNSON 2016, supra note 28, at 6–7. 
 178.  Reclassification, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/ 
CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDRH/CDRHTransparency/ucm378
724.htm (last updated Dec. 19, 2017). 
 179.  Id. 
 180.  The dates were selected to ensure at least one year of observation for all devices. 
Thus, supplements granted between November 1, 2015, and November 1, 2016, for devices 
granted an original PMA before November 1, 2015, were included in the data sets. 
 181.  For example, the St. Jude Silzone valve (P810002) was recalled in 2000, but is not 
included in the FDS recalls database. See In re St. Jude Silzone Heart Valves Prod. Liab. Litig., 
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might not have been on the market and at risk for recall during the 
study period. Including these devices in the denominator of the risk 
calculation would bias the results toward a lower-than-actual risk 
value. The Primary Data Set contained 389 Original PMA approved 
devices and 9217 PMA Supplements. 
To examine the performance of FDA premarket evaluation under 
recent statutory and regulatory frameworks, I created a subset of the 
Primary Data Set, the “Restricted Data Set.” This consisted of 
devices approved at least one year after the significant statutory 
overhaul made by the FDA Amendments Act in 2007.182 
The  Restricted Data Set contained 199 original and 3666 
PMA Supplements. 
I also created an “Expanded Data Set,” consisting of all PMA-
approved Class III devices in the FDA database, including devices 
approved before November 1, 2002. Again, devices that had been 
reclassified to Class I or Class II were excluded. Further, to avoid the 
inclusion of devices that had been approved long before but were no 
longer marketed by the beginning of the study period, I excluded 
devices originally approved prior to November 1, 2002, for which no 
supplemental approvals were granted during the study period. Thus, 
each device in the Expanded Dataset had at least one approval (an 
original or a supplemental PMA) during the study period. The 
Expanded Data Set contained 755 Original PMA approvals and 
26,674 PMA Supplements. 
For the Primary Data Set I calculated the risk of Class 1 recall as: 
 Number of devices approved between Nov. 1, 2002,  And Nov. 1, 2015, that had a recall during the study period Number of devices approved between  Nov. 1, 2002, and Nov. 1, 2015 
 
An analogous calculation was performed for the Restricted Data 
Set. For the Expanded Data Set, I calculated the risk as: 
 
 
No. MDL 01-1396 JRTFLN, 2004 WL 45503, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 5, 2004) (“In response 
to the voluntary recall, the FDA informed St. Jude that its actions would be considered 
a  ‘recall.’”). 
 182.  See supra note 56. 
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 Number of devices that had a recall during the study period Number of devices with an original or supplemental  PMA approved during the study period 
 
Devices that were subjected to more than one Class 1 recall 
during the study period were counted only once, with all data entries 
after the first Class 1 recall being censored. 
Statistical analyses were performed using Stata. Unless otherwise 
noted, comparisons of continuous variables were performed using 
two-tailed t-tests with unequal variances, and comparisons of 
categorical variables were performed using Pearson’s chi-squared 
tests. A p value of .05 was considered to be statistically significant. 
Multiple logistic regression analysis was performed to determine the 
relationship between recalls and the variables found to independently 
predict recall. 
C. Results 
1. Descriptive findings 
Manufacturers gained approval for a wide range of devices 
through the PMA pathway. As of September 30, 2016, the entire 
FDA PMA Approval database contained 1407 devices that were 
granted an original PMA approval. In the Primary Data Set, 389 
devices had received an original PMA. Seventeen different review 
panels evaluated the PMA applications for the devices in the Primary 
Data Set. The number of original applications approved by each 
panel varied from 2 (General Hospital, Physical Medicine) to 135 
(Cardiovascular). Six panels reviewed 25 or more devices 
(Cardiovascular, Microbiology, Ophthalmic, Orthopedic, Pathology, 
General and Plastic Surgery). The Cardiovascular panel accounted 
for the plurality of devices reviewed.183 
Confirming the findings of prior studies,184 manufacturers have 
made extensive use of the PMA Supplement pathways. The entire 
FDA PMA database contained 31,879 approved PMA 
 
 183.  The cardiovascular panel reviewed 34.7% of devices in the primary data set. 
 184.  See supra notes 113–15 and accompanying text. 
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Supplements.185 The number of supplements granted by each panel 
varied widely, from 8 (Physical Medicine) to 5279 (Cardiovascular) 
in the Primary Data Set. In the Primary Data Set, the median 
number of supplements (including those used for minor 
modifications, such as 30-Day Notice and 135-Day supplements) 
was 12 per original PMA approval, ranging from 0 to 291. 
Considering only Panel Track and 180-Day Supplements, which are 
used for more significant modifications, the median number of 
supplements was 3 (range 0 to 49). 
In the Primary Data Set, 4.6% of devices at risk were subjected to 
a Class 1 recall (18 out of 389 devices) during the study period. Of 
the 18 devices that were the subjects of Class 1 recalls, 16 had one 
recall, one device had 2, and one device had 6 recalls.186 Limiting the 
analysis to devices approved after implementation of FDAAA, the 
devices in the Restricted Data Set had a rate of recall of 5.0% (10 out 
of 199). 
The 24 Class 1 recalls of devices in the Primary Data Set 
involved a wide variety of products.187 The most frequently recalled 
devices were stents (5 recalls) and artificial hearts/ventricular assist 
devices (3 recalls). Other recalled devices included heart valves (2), 
angioplasty catheters (2), intraocular lenses (1), invasive blood 
glucose monitors (1), infant cooling caps (1), anesthesia 
administration systems (1), embolization coils (1), and an injectable 
bulking agent (1).188 These recalls covered over 660,000 individual 
device units.189 
Of the 24 total Class 1 recalls involving devices in the Primary 
Data Set, the FDA had not established the root cause for 3 recalls as 
of June 2017.190 Of the 21 recalls for which the FDA had 
determined a cause, 7 (33.3%) were attributed to design defects, 3 
(14.3%) were attributed to component design/selection, and 2 
(9.5%) were attributed to process design.191 Thus, over half (57.1%) 
 
 185.  For simplicity, I include 30-Day Notices in the PMA Supplement total, unless 
otherwise specified. 
 186.  See App. 1 for details. 
 187.  Id. 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  Id. 
 190.  Id. 
 191.  Id. 
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of the Class 1 recalls were attributed to design problems that might 
have been detected with a more robust premarket evaluation.192 
These recalls involved nearly 400,000 individual units.193 A smaller 
number of recalls were due to problems that likely would not have 
been detected by a more robust premarket evaluation, including one 
recall attributed to “use error” and two attributed to a 
“nonconforming material or component.”194 
By using the Expanded Data Set, I assessed the performance of 
PMA review for as large a set of marketed devices as possible. In the 
Expanded Data Set, 6.0% of devices were subjected to a Class 1 
recall (45 out of 755 devices) during the study period. The f45 
recalled devices had a total of 66 recalls. Eight devices had more than 
one Class 1 recall (range 2 to 11). Since nearly half of the devices in 
the Expanded Data Set were marketed before the FDA’s Recall 
Database began collecting data, it is likely that the actual risk of 
recall for all Class III devices on the market during the study period 
was higher than 6.0%. 
2. Hypothesis testing 
H1: An increased number of PMA Supplements is associated with a 
higher likelihood of Class 1 recall. 
Considering all modifications, including minor changes made 
through 30-Day Notifications and 135-Day and Real-Time 
supplements, the number of supplements did not correlate with the 
likelihood of an initial Class 1 recall. In the Primary Data Set, devices 
that were recalled had an average of 32.4±26.8 supplements, while 
those not recalled had an average of 23.3±33.2 supplements (p=.25). 
Although devices in the upper quartile of number of total 
supplements were more likely to be recalled than other devices, 7.4% 
versus 3.7%, the difference was not statistically significant (p=.15). 
However, when only the most significant modifications (those 
made through Panel-Track and 180-Day Supplements) are 
considered, the number of supplements does correlate with the 
likelihood of a first Class 1 recall. Devices that were recalled had 
 
 192.  Id. 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  Id. 
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received a median of 5.5 supplements (range 0 to 15), compared 
with two supplements (range 0 to 49) for non-recalled devices.195 
Devices in the upper quartile of the number of Panel-Track and 180-
Day Supplements (seven or more) were significantly more likely to 
be recalled than other devices: 9.2% versus 3.3% for devices with 6 or 
fewer supplements (p=.027). Thus, a large number of significant 
modifications made to a device through PMA Supplements appears 
to correlate with the risk of recall. 
H2: More rapid supplementation is associated with a higher risk of 
Class 1 recall. 
For each device, I calculated the “supplementation interval” for 
all supplements granted as 
 Days from Original Approval to Nov. 1, 2016
∑(All Supplements Granted) + 1  
 
and the supplementation interval for only 180-Day and Panel 
Track supplements as 
 Days from Approval to Nov. 1, 2016
∑(180-Day and Panel Track Supplements) + 1 
 
Including all supplements, the median supplementation interval 
for recalled devices was 75 days (range 18.5 to 988.4), and for non-
recalled devices was 153.3 days (range 9.4 to 5051). Limiting the 
analysis to the most significant modifications (those made through 
180-Day and Panel-Track Supplements), recalled devices had a 
median supplementation interval of 293.2 (range 103 to 1829) days, 
while non-recalled devices had a median interval of 596 (range 79.2 
to 5073) days.196 Devices whose supplementation interval for 180-
Day and Panel-Track supplements was in the lowest quartile (335 
days or less) were more likely to be recalled, 9.4% versus 
3.1%  (p=.01).197 
 
 195.  Because the distribution was strongly non-normal, t-testing is not appropriate. 
 196.  Because the distribution was strongly non-normal, t-testing is not appropriate. 
 197.  For administrative convenience, an interval based on a cut-off of one year might be 
more useful. Devices with a 180-Day and Panel Track supplementation interval of one year 
(365 days, n=116) or less had a recall risk of 8.7%, while devices with a longer interval (n=273) 
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If the shorter interval for recalled devices resulted from 
manufacturers’ use of post-recall PMA Supplements to correct 
problems, the intervals should be shorter after a recall than before. 
To assess this, I examined the supplementation intervals for recalled 
devices before and after the first Class 1 recall. The intervals for 180-
Day and Panel-Track supplements was not significantly different 
(266±236 versus 247±145 days, p=.79) in these two periods.198 
Thus, the supplementation intervals for these devices were essentially 
the same before and after their first (or only) Class 1 recall. 
H3: Longer time on the market correlates with the occurrence of 
Class 1 recalls. 
Dividing the devices into three subgroups based on their 
approval dates (before November 1, 2002; November 1, 2002, to 
September 27, 2008; and after September 27, 2008), the risk of 
recall was 7.4%, 4.2%, and 5.0%, respectively. The differences were 
not statistically significant (p=.25 by Pearson’s chi-square test). Thus, 
the study does not suggest that an earlier date of original PMA 
approval correlates with the risk of Class 1 recall. However, the 
hypothesis as to devices approved prior to November 1, 2002, 
cannot be rejected, because the FDA database does not include 
recalls prior to this date. Thus, whether devices sold under earlier-
granted PMAs are more likely to be recalled remains an 
open  question. 
In the Primary Data Set, recalled devices had been on the market 
1198+1070 days until the first recall. The shortest interval from 
approval to first Class 1 recall was 119 days, and the longest was over 
10.5 years. Fifteen of the eighteen recalled devices were recalled less 
than five years after original PMA approval. Thus, in the Primary 
Data Set, the suggestion that device failures tend to occur within a 
 
had a recall risk of 2.9%. By Pearson’s chi-squared analysis, this difference is significant, with a 
p value of .013. 
 198.  Of the eighteen recalled devices, sixteen remained on the market and were granted 
subsequent supplemental PMAs. The analysis was limited these devices. The pre-recall 
supplementation interval was calculated as “Time from Approval to Recall” divided by the 
“Total Number of 180-Day and Panel Track Supplements + 1.” The post recall interval was 
calculated as “Time from Recall to Final Supplement” divided by the “Total Number of 180-
Day and Panel Track Supplements + 1.” Comparisons were performed using two-tailed t-tests 
with equal variance. 
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relatively short time after original PMA approval finds at least 
some  support. 
H4: Assignment to the Cardiovascular and General Hospital Panels 
correlates with the occurrence of Class 1 recalls. 
The Primary Data Set included only two devices approved by the 
General Hospital panel. Because of this small number, I could not 
test the hypothesis that these devices have a higher risk of Class 
1  recall. 
When all devices are included in the analysis, the advisory panel 
that reviewed the original PMA application did not correlate with 
the risk of recall (chi-squared p=.073). However, considering only 
the six panels that reviewed twenty-five or more devices, 
Cardiovascular devices were more likely to be recalled (8.9% versus 
0.6%) than devices approved by the other panels 
(Gastroenterology/Urology, Microbiology, Ophthalmic, Ortho-
pedic, Pathology, General/Plastic Surgery; p=.026).199 
Certain attributes of Cardiovascular devices might account for 
the higher frequency of Class 1 recall. Cardiovascular devices are 
more often classified by the FDA as life-sustaining (76%, versus 37% 
for non-Cardiovascular devices, p<.01) and are more often implanted 
than other devices (54% versus 3%, p<.01). However, neither of 
these classifications correlated with the occurrence of recalls of 
Cardiovascular devices.200 
Another possibility is that the FDA applies a lower threshold to 
label corrective actions taken by manufacturers of cardiovascular 
devices as Class 1 recalls. If so, one would expect that a larger 
fraction of Class 1 recalls of Cardiovascular devices would be for less 
serious problems. Using the information available in the FDA Recall 
Database and other FDA communications about the eighteen recalls 
in the Primary Data Set, and reports available in the medical 
literature at the time of the recall, this does not appear to be the 
case. The problem for which the FDA ordered a Class 1 recall had 
 
 199.  The risk of recall of all non-cardiac devices, including those reviewed by panels that 
approved fewer than 25 original PMAs, was 2.6%. 
 200.  Cardiovascular devices classified as implanted had a 9.8% risk of recall, while non-
implanted Cardiovascular devices had a 6.0% risk (p=.51). Cardiovascular devices classified as 
life sustaining had a 6.8% risk of recall, while non-life sustaining Cardiovascular devices had an 
11.3% risk (p=.37). 
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manifested in clinical practice (as opposed to manifesting only in 
bench testing) with nearly equal frequency: The Class 1 recalls for 
seven of the twelve recalled Cardiovascular devices and for three of 
the six recalled non-Cardiovascular devices were for a problem that 
had manifested in clinical practice (p=.74). Reports of serious injuries 
that occurred prior to the Class 1 recall could be located in 50% of 
cardiovascular device recalls and 33% of non-cardiovascular device 
recalls (p=.74). Thus, it does not appear that the FDA applies a 
lower threshold to classify a corrective action for Cardiovascular 
devices as a Class 1 recall.201 
H5: Classification as an Implanted Device correlates with the 
occurrence of Class 1 recalls. 
H6: Devices classified as Life Sustaining will be more likely to have 
a Class 1 recall. 
Neither of these classifications correlated with the risk of recall. 
Implanted devices had a recall risk of 5.6% (11 out of 195), while 
non-implanted devices had a risk of 3.6% (7 out of 193, p=.63). Life-
sustaining devices had a risk of recall of 6.3% (5 out of 80), and non-
life sustaining devices had a risk of 4.2% (13 out of 309, p=.44). 
Stratifying the devices by cardiovascular/non-cardiovascular type, 
neither implant nor life-sustaining classification correlated with the 
risk of recall. 
H7: Following a Class 1 recall, devices will have a higher risk of a 
second Class 1 recall compared with the risk that all devices have a 
first Class 1 recall. 
In the Primary Data Set, once a device had a Class 1 recall, the 
risk of a subsequent Class 1 recall was 11.1% (2 out of 18). Treating 
the eighteen devices that had an initial Class 1 recall as a separate 
population and second recalls as independent events, this frequency 
was not significantly different from the risk that any device had an 
initial Class 1 recall (p=.21). In the Expanded Data Set, eight devices 
with a Class 1 recall (out of forty-five) had a subsequent Class 1 
recall,202 yielding a risk of a subsequent recall of 17.8% (8 out of 45). 
 
 201.  See infra, Part V, for a discussion of other possible reasons. 
 202.  One device had a subsequent Class 1 recall (after an initial Class 1 recall) that 
occurred as a result of the manufacturer’s attempt to correct the initially-identified problem. I 
included this recall since it was not merely an expansion of an earlier recall to other lots. 
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This was significantly higher than the 6.0% risk of an initial Class 1 
recall in the full data set (p=.048). The study findings are thus 
equivocal as to whether hypothesis H7 should be rejected. 
 
* * * 
 
To determine whether device type (Cardiovascular versus non-
Cardiovascular), number of 180-Day and Panel-Track supplements, 
and supplementation interval were independent predictors of recall, I 
performed a multiple logistic regression analysis. I assigned a dummy 
variable of “1” for Cardiovascular devices, devices with that number 
of supplements in the upper quartile, and devices with the 
supplementation interval in the shortest quartile, and a dummy 
variable of “0” for non-Cardiovascular devices, devices with the 
number of 180-Day and Panel Track supplements not in the upper 
quartile, and devices with a supplementation interval not in the 
shortest quartile. Cardiovascular device type (coefficient 1.18, 
p=.026) remained as an independent predictor of recall. 
Stratifying by device type, Cardiovascular devices had been 
granted a median of four (range 0 to 49) Panel-Track and 180-Day 
supplements. Devices with four or fewer supplements had a recall 
rate of 2.8%, while devices with five or more supplements had a rate 
of 15.6% (p=.009). Cardiovascular devices had a median 
supplementation interval of 477.6 days. Devices with intervals 
shorter than this had a recall rate of 17.7%, while devices with longer 
intervals had a recall rate of 3.0% (p=.017). 
For non-Cardiovascular devices, the median number of 180-Day 
and Panel Track supplements was two (range 0 to 37). Although 
devices at or below the median were recalled less frequently than 
those above the median, 0.7% versus 4.3%, this difference was not 
statistically significant (p=.061). The recall rate for devices with 
supplementation intervals at or shorter than the median was not 
significantly different than for devices with longer intervals, 3.1% 
versus 1.6% (p=.41). 
V. A DATA-DRIVEN ANALYSIS OF THE PMA FRAMEWORK 
The PMA approval process is designed to provide a rigorous 
assessment of high-risk medical device safety. In spite of this, the 
PMA process must accommodate other policy goals. Chief among 
these is that premarket evaluation neither impose such high costs as 
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to impede the development of new, potentially life-saving 
technologies nor impose such high regulatory burdens as to delay 
the availability of these new technologies to millions of Americans. 
In order to situate the findings of the empirical study presented 
here, it is necessary to recall the ways in which the rigors of 
premarket evaluation have been relaxed in an attempt to balance 
these competing objectives. Congress requires the FDA to adopt the 
least burdensome approach to regulating each Class III device.203 
The FDA has interpreted this as permitting it to make a 
determination of safety and efficacy based on a single study, and on 
studies that used surrogate endpoints, limited durations, and other 
protocol elements that do not meet strict scientific standards.204 
Further, manufacturers can modify devices through the PMA 
Supplement pathways, which impose even less rigorous data 
requirements. And by iteratively modifying devices through PMA 
supplements, an equivalent to predicate drift may occur, resulting in 
devices that bear little resemblance to their progenitors. 
The resulting question is whether Congress and the FDA have 
struck a desirable balance between ensuring the safety of, and not 
hampering the innovation of and access to, new technologies. In 
brief, the concerns raised in Parts II and III, and the study presented 
in Part IV of this Article suggest that the answer is “No.” The first 
finding of the study is that the chance that a PMA-approved, Class 
III medical device will be recalled is higher than most prior studies 
have suggested.205 The FDA classified manufacturers’ actions as Class 
1 recalls for 4.6% of devices approved after November 1, 2002. 
Considering all Class III devices, including those approved before 
 
 203.  21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(3)(D)(ii) (2012). 
 204.  21 C.F.R. § 860.7 (2017); LEAST BURDENSOME PROVISIONS, supra note 15. 
 205.  Most prior studies have reported an incidence of Class 1 recalls for high-risk, PMA 
approved devices of 0.45% to 0.85%. These studies utilized a methodology that considered 
every modification made through a PMA supplement to be a new, distinct device. See supra 
Section II.B. My study is consistent with these findings: re-analyzing my data using the total 
number of original PMA, 180-Day, and Panel Track approvals as the denominator for the risk 
calculation, the devices in my Primary Data Set had risk of recall of 0.8%. In the only prior 
study to use a similar methodology to the one employed here, Rathi and colleagues found a 
3.6% chance of recall. However, Rathi’s sample size was small and the study duration was 
limited. See supra notes 155–57. Not surprisingly, since my study followed devices for a much 
longer period of time, I found a higher risk of recall. However, my findings are also consistent 
with those of Rathi: Including only recalls issued within five years of approval (close to the 
follow-up duration of Rathi’s study), the risk of recall is 3.9% in my data. 
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the FDA began collating data on recalls, my study finds that the risk 
of recall is 6.0%. This underestimates the true risk of recall, since the 
older devices may have been recalled prior to November 1, 2002, 
when the data in the FDA’s publicly-accessible database on recalls 
begins. And as discussed in Part VI, infra, several factors ensure that 
the true risk of failure is even higher. 
These recalls reflect device failures that the FDA judged to pose a 
“reasonable probability” of “serious adverse health consequences or 
death.”206 In the Class III devices approved after November 1, 2002, 
these recalls affected more than 660,000 individually marketed 
units.207 Thus, the current study suggests that weaknesses in the 
premarket evaluation of medical devices pervade the PMA process as 
well as the 510(k) process, leading to serious failures that impact 
large numbers of people. 
Professor Hall has implied that using Class 1 recalls as a proxy for 
device failures that compromise safety tends to overestimate the risks 
presented by device failures. In a statement to a Senate 
subcommittee investigating the performance of the 510(k) pathway, 
Hall argued that Class 1 recalls “represent all recalls with any 
meaningful risk to patients.”208 Continuing, he noted that devices 
failing at rates “as low as 1/20,000 have been classified as Class [1] 
recalls.”209 However, anecdotal accounts of the human costs of these 
failures are easy to find,210 and the scholarly literature indicates that 
deaths and injuries related to medical devices are frequent. Artificial, 
metal-on-metal hip joints have been implanted in over 500,000 
people in the United States, many of whom have required a re-
operation to replace the prosthesis because of component 
breakdowns that caused severe pain and decreased mobility.211 Data 
from 2006 indicate that over 100,000 people suffered a device-
 
 206.  Industry Guidance, supra note 138. 
 207.  See App. 1. 
 208.  Hearings, supra note 20, at 87 (statement of Ralph F. Hall). 
 209.  Id. 
 210.  See Stengel v. Medtronic, Inc., 704 F.3d 1224, 1227 (9th Cir. 2013) (partial 
paralysis due to an infusion pump); Barry Meier, Maker of Heart Device Kept Flaw from 
Doctors, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/24/business
/maker-of-heart-device-kept-flaw-from-doctors.html?_r=0 (sudden death due to malfunction 
of an implanted defibrillator). 
 211.  Hearings, supra note 20, at 67–68 (statement of Diana Zuckerman); JOHNSON 
2016, supra note 28, at 2. 
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related injury.212 And independent analysts have estimated that in 
2009 alone, over 4,500 device-related deaths occurred.213 Likewise, 
examples of the economic costs imposed by these failures are easy to 
find. The failure of a single medical device, the Medtronic Sprint 
Fidelis defibrillator lead, has the potential to cost Medicare between 
$287 million and $1.2 billion.214 
The study findings suggest that Congress’s least burdensome 
approach directive and the FDA’s implementation of that directive 
are compromising device safety. Unfortunately, several provisions of 
the recently-enacted 21st Century Cures Act have the potential to 
tip the balance further in an unfavorable direction. Section 3058 of 
the Act emphasizes the application of the least burdensome 
approach.215 Manufacturers already may gain market approval on the 
basis of a single pivotal study that is not blinded, does not have a 
comparator group, uses surrogate endpoints, contains significant 
methodological flaws and inconsistencies, and is of short duration. 
The Cures Act will push the FDA even more strongly toward 
requiring less rigorous safety data. 
Some of these compromises are unavoidable. Blinding may be 
impossible for implanted devices (or at least raise prohibitive ethical 
restraints).216 But other protocol weaknesses could be addressed by 
the FDA, even within the constraints of the least burdensome 
approach: If the failure rate of PMA-approved devices is too high, 
then the information currently being required does not provide the 
statutorily required “reasonable assurance of . . . safety.”217 The FDA 
could require longer studies and study designs that examine actual, 
not surrogate, outcomes. And the FDA could reject studies that 
contain flaws such as discrepancies in subject numbers and the 
reliance on post-hoc analysis to establish safety and efficacy. These 
 
 212.  JOHNSON 2012, supra note 36, at 2–3. 
 213.  Id. at 3. 
 214.  Mehrotra, supra note 38, at 1195. 
 215.  21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114–255, § 3058(a), 130 Stat. 1033, 1128 
(2016) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360c). The Act defines “least burdensome” to 
mean the FDA could require only “the minimum required information that would support a 
determination by the Secretary that an application provides a reasonable assurance of the safety 
and effectiveness of the device.” Id. § 3058(b), 130 Stat. at 1129. 
 216.  Kramer et al., supra note 84, at 3. 
 217.  21st Century Cures Act § 3058(a), 130 Stat. at 1128–29. 
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changes should be possible at the administrative level, without 
congressional action. However, the Cures Act, by emphasizing the 
least burdensome approach, may limit the FDA’s flexibility. 
The Cures Act contains another provision that may tip the 
balance between safety and innovation/access unfavorably: for 
breakthrough technologies, the FDA is permitted to reduce the pre-
market burden on manufacturers to produce clinical trial data 
“through utilization of timely postmarket data collection.”218 And 
for other Class III medical devices, this shift to reliance on post-
market data is strongly encouraged: “[T]he Secretary shall consider 
the role of postmarket information in determining the least 
burdensome means of demonstrating a reasonable assurance of 
device safety and effectiveness.”219 These directives push the FDA 
toward granting PMA applications based on smaller and shorter-
duration premarket studies. 
Post-market studies and surveillance will function under section 
3058 as early warning systems, detecting the first signs of a pattern 
of failures which will trigger a corrective action by the manufacturer 
and the FDA. However, the ability of such a system to minimize 
harms caused by failing devices is limited. New devices are now 
rapidly incorporated into clinical practice—within a few years, 
hundreds of thousands of patients may be exposed to a newly-
approved device.220 Unfortunately, device failures may take longer 
than this to manifest and trigger recognition.221 Thus hundreds of 
thousands of units of an artificial hip or a defibrillator lead that break 
down prematurely after only two or three years may be implanted 
into patients before a pattern of premature failure is recognized. 
This problem arises from two sources. First, short-duration 
premarket studies of devices intended for long-term use—especially 
for implanted devices—cannot detect failures that manifest only after 
a period of time longer than the studies themselves. Second, health 
care providers rapidly adopt new technologies without fully 
understanding the limitations of the data that supported 
FDA  approval. 
 
 218.  Id. § 3051, 130 Stat. at 1121–23. 
 219.  Id. § 3058(b), 130 Stat. at 1129. 
 220.  See supra notes 130–31 and accompanying text. 
 221.  See supra notes 130–31 and accompanying text. 
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These temporal patterns, in turn, suggest two possible solutions. 
The first would address the problem of short-duration studies. 
Congress could amend the Cures Act, eliminating the shift in data 
production to the post-market period required by section 3058. In 
fact, Congress could require that reliance on post-market data be a 
last, not a first, resort. This would incentivize the FDA to require the 
results of longer-term pre-market studies before declaring a device 
safe. Or Congress could permit the FDA to use its expertise to 
determine the premarket/post-market data requirement for each 
device, free from the push toward post-market data provided by the 
Cures  Act.  
The second possible solution would address the rate at which 
patients are exposed to newly-approved devices. The FDA has 
limited authority to impose restrictions on the sale and distribution 
of devices at the time of PMA approval.222 This authority is triggered 
when “there cannot otherwise be reasonable assurance of [a device’s] 
safety and effectiveness.”223 An FDA determination that a shift in 
data production to the post-market period satisfied this provision 
could provide the agency with the authority to impose restrictions 
on how many device units may be sold until adequate long-term 
safety data has been collected. 
This suggestion raises the same balancing issues that the present 
study examines: If the FDA restricts the number of devices allowed 
onto the market, the collection of long-term, “real world” safety 
data will be delayed. Further, “real world” experience with device 
efficacy would be reduced, potentially delaying the implementation 
of design and labeling improvements. Thus, the FDA would need to 
carefully consider, on a case-by-case basis, whether and to what 
extent it should impose restrictions on the number of newly-
approved devices that may be sold. 
The study presented in Part IV also provides support for other, 
targeted alterations of the PMA process. Based on the finding that 
devices approved by the Cardiovascular panel are significantly more 
likely than other devices to be subjected to a Class 1 recall, it would 
be prudent for the FDA to require a more robust set of safety data 
for these devices. This could include requiring more than one pivotal 
 
 222.  See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(1)(B)(ii) (2012). 
 223.  Id. § 360j(e)(1)(B). 
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study, longer studies, and strict adherence to standard study 
protocols. This should be within the FDA’s existing authority. 
Looking more deeply, it is useful to consider why Cardiovascular 
devices have a higher risk of recall. One possibility is that these 
devices are more often used for life-sustaining functions, and thus 
that their failures are more rapidly and routinely detected. But the 
study findings refute this: devices that the FDA classifies as life 
sustaining were not significantly more likely to be recalled than other 
devices.224 Another possibility is that because many of these devices, 
including artificial valves, stents, leads, pacemakers, and defibrillators, 
are implanted, they carry higher risks of serious complications. 
Again, the study findings refute this: implanted devices were no 
more likely to be recalled than other devices.225 
Cardiovascular devices have other characteristics that likely 
underlie the higher failure rate. These devices are among the most 
complex on the market, often featuring multicomponent 
composition, miniaturization, the incorporation of computer 
hardware and software, and a rapid rate at which technology is 
developing.226 These devices have very high “connectivity 
complexity,” which measures “the number of relations/ 
interconnections between the components of a given system.”227 
These devices also have high “user complexity,” placing substantial 
cognitive demands on health care providers and device users. These 
and other complexity factors might serve as triggers for heightened 
FDA scrutiny. The FDA currently uses a scoring algorithm to 
categorize clinical laboratory testing devices based on their 
complexity.228 As required by the Clinical Laboratory Improvement 
Amendments of 1988,229 device complexity is scored based on 
several factors specific to laboratory devices.230 The agency could 
 
 224.  See supra Part III. 
 225.  See supra Part III. 
 226.  See supra notes 106–09 and accompanying text. 
 227.  Senders, supra note 106, at i42 app. 1. 
 228.  Id. 
 229.  Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-578, § 
2, 102 Stat. 2903, 2903 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 263a (1997)). 
 230.  CLIA Categorizations, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Medical 
Devices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/IVDRegulatoryAssistance/ucm393229.htm (last up-
dated Apr. 16, 2014) (scoring complexity based on “the scientific and technical knowledge . . . 
required to perform the test,” the “[t]raining and experience” required, the ease with which 
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develop a broadly applicable algorithm that could determine when a 
device category (defined by product code) has become sufficiently 
complex as to trigger heightened premarket study data requirements. 
As devices bearing a particular product code incorporate computer 
technology and multiple components, undergo miniaturization, and 
place higher cognitive demands on providers and users, the 
complexity score of that product code would increase. Eventually, 
the aggregate score would trigger more rigorous premarket scrutiny 
for all devices bearing that product  code. 
Based on my findings that Cardiovascular devices with more 
180-Day and Panel-Track supplements, and with shorter intervals 
between those supplements, are more likely to be subjects of Class 1 
recalls, modifications to the PMA Supplement pathways should also 
be considered. These findings are consistent with the possibility that 
rapid, iterative changes to the most complex devices through the 
PMA Supplement pathways allows devices to reach the market 
without a thorough evaluation for safety. One way to mitigate this 
risk would be to impose a limit on how many 180-Day and Panel-
Track supplements may be granted, after which a manufacturer 
would be required to either submit an original PMA application with 
complete information or a more robust set of clinical data in a 
supplemental application.231 My study findings suggest that after a 
Cardiovascular device manufacturer has made four significant 
changes to a device, a fifth supplemental application should be 
converted to an original PMA or should be required to contain data 
demonstrating the overall safety of the device. Alternatively, the 
increased risk might be mitigated by requiring a specified period of 
clinical use following any significant modification before another 
Panel-Track or 180-Day supplement will be granted. This would 
 
the reagents may be used, the degree of automation, the stability and reliability of the 
calibration process, the ease of troubleshooting, and the amount of interpretation and 
judgement that must be used). 
 231.  Ben Rome and colleagues suggested that an expert panel review PMA-approved 
devices every five to seven years to determine whether additional clinical data should be 
required for supplemental PMA applications. Rome et al., supra note 78, at 390. However, in 
my study fifteen of eighteen recalled devices were recalled within five years of approval. One 
possible response would be to require expert review even earlier than five years. However, since 
most devices are not recalled, this would impose a large burden in order to identify a relatively 
small number of risks. Using the number of or interval between 180-Day and Panel-Track 
PMA supplements permits a more targeted intervention. 
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provide an opportunity for manufacturers, prescribers, and the FDA 
to recognize safety issues that the first modification created; this 
recognition might guide future changes to the device, allowing 
better assurance of safety. Alternatively, applications for 180-Day or 
Panel-Track supplements within a short time of an earlier 
supplement might trigger closer scrutiny by the FDA, with an 
increased quantum or quality of data required in this circumstance. 
These requirements should currently apply to Cardiovascular devices. 
When other devices become sufficiently complex, these requirements 
should apply to them as well. 
It is important to recognize that placing new limitations on 
device modifications made through PMA Supplement pathways 
would not deprive patients of access to breakthrough technologies. 
Devices based on novel technologies that offer treatments for 
currently untreatable problems would be evaluated through a new, 
original PMA application. The limits on PMA Supplement approvals 
that I am suggesting would certainly delay access to modified devices 
but would have no direct impact on the availability of truly 
new  devices. 
Other findings provide reassurance about the PMA Supplement 
pathways. For non-Cardiovascular devices, neither the absolute 
number of 180-Day and Panel-Track supplements nor the rate at 
which the FDA has granted them appears to predict the occurrence 
of a Class 1 recall. For devices with low complexity, the supplemental 
PMA pathways appear to offer a relatively inexpensive and timely 
route for making incremental, evolutionary changes to medical 
devices. The limited safety evaluation required under these pathways 
appears sufficient to ensure device safety. 
Some commentators have raised concerns that even minor 
changes, when made iteratively, might compromise device safety.232 
However, the total number of supplements (including those used for 
trivial alterations) and the rate at which all supplements were granted 
did not correlate with the occurrence of Class 1 recalls, even in 
Cardiovascular devices.233 This should provide reassurance that 
 
 232.  See supra Section II.C. 
 233.  Cardiovascular devices in the upper quartile of total number of supplements 
granted had a recall risk of 9.1%, compared with 8.8% for other devices (p=.96). 
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frequent use of 30-Day, Real-Time, and other pathways for minor 
device modifications does not compromise safety. 
Finally, the present study suggests that following a Class 1 recall, 
the FDA should consider requiring additional safety assurance if a 
device is to remain on the market. The conditional phrasing of this 
suggestion is deliberate: The finding that a Class 1 recall predicts a 
higher risk of subsequent Class 1 recalls is more tenuous, with 
statistical significance only in some data sets. 
VI. LIMITATIONS OF THE EXISTING EMPIRICAL DATA ON THE 
SAFETY OF PMA APPROVED DEVICES: CONSIDERATIONS FOR 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
It is possible to read the empirical literature on the PMA process 
as providing evidence that the formally rigorous pathway functions 
well to ensure the safety of the highest-risk medical devices. Most 
prior studies have suggested a low risk of device failure. Even the 
study presented here indicates that roughly 95% of devices will not 
fail in such a way as to endanger patients’ lives and health. 
Unfortunately, all of these studies define only a best-case 
scenario. This is because all have used the FDA classification of a 
corrective action as a Class 1 recall as the proxy for costly, potentially 
life-threatening device-related problems that were not detected 
during the PMA process. Limiting the analysis to FDA data on Class 
1 recalls underestimates the number of relevant failures. First, device 
failures must be reported in order to be entered into the FDA’s 
databases. Estimates of the underreporting of device problems range 
from 10% to 99.5%.234 Although Congress has at times strengthened 
manufacturers’ and hospitals’ tracking and reporting obligations,235 
several factors contribute to the persistent underreporting of device 
failures. Reporting depends in part on patients, physicians, and 
hospitals making efforts to alert the Agency to problems. Patients 
 
 234.  See Ward & Clarkson, supra note 135, at 5 (describing underreporting rates for 
device-related medical errors ranging from 10 to 80%); Hearings, supra note 20, at 11 
(statement of Frederic S. Resnic) (citing GAO estimate that only 0.5% of medical device 
adverse events are reported to the FDA). 
 235.  See Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-629, § 2, 104 Stat. 5411, 
5411 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360i) (requiring hospitals and other facilities to 
report information to the manufacturer and the FDA that suggests a device caused or 
contributed to a patient’s death, serious illness, or serious injury). 
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may never recognize a device flaw; in the most serious situations, the 
abrupt failure of a device upon which a patient’s life depends can 
lead to sudden death with no obvious cause. In many patient 
populations—the elderly and those with comorbidities—deaths may 
be attributed to other causes, delaying or even preventing discovery 
of a device problem. Physicians may fail to realize the importance of 
reporting device problems.236 Congress has eased manufacturers’ and 
hospitals’ reporting requirements.237 And device manufacturers have 
strong incentives to avoid alerting the FDA to problems with their 
medical devices.238 
In addition, even when device failures are reported to the FDA, 
restricting the scope of a study to Class 1 recalls assumes the FDA 
correctly classified the event. However, the low quality of many of 
the individual reports may prevent or delay the Agency’s recognition 
of a pattern of device failures;239 low quality reports could also 
prevent the FDA from appropriately classifying a recall. Further, 
manufacturers may influence the FDA’s classification of a recall 
through the strategic presentation of information to the Agency and 
the public. Downplaying the extent or severity of a device failure, 
suggesting that monitoring can detect clinical risk before it 
manifests, and emphasizing the adverse consequences of corrective 
action are among many strategies that could tilt the FDA toward 
classifying a recall as Class 2 rather than Class 1.240 Finally, FDA 
classification of medical device recalls is inherently subjective.241 The 
 
 236.  See Hearings, supra note 20, at 68 (statement of Diana Zuckerman). 
 237.  See Food and Drug Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 213, 111 
Stat. 2296, 2346 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360i) (removing certain reporting 
obligations for hospitals and device manufacturers). 
 238.  See Thirumalai & Sinha, supra note 9, at 379 (discussing factors including the costs 
of replacing defective devices, the costs of the recall itself, costs related to inventory of the 
recalled device that cannot be sold, loss of market share, reputational harm). All of the factors 
that Thirumalai and Sinha discuss could incentivize manufacturers to refrain from informing 
the FDA of device-related problems in spite of their statutory duties to do so. 
 239.  See, e.g., Kramer et al., supra note 147  (reporting that FDA had accumulated 679 
reports over three years of Sprint Fidelis lead failures before it issued a recall). 
 240.  For example, Guidant justified not informing the FDA, physicians, and patients 
about failures of certain implantable defibrillators because of the risks associated with surgical 
replacement of the devices. See Robert G. Hauser & Barry J. Maron, Lessons from the Failure 
and Recall of an Implantable Cardioverter-Defibrillator, 112 CIRCULATION 2040 (2005). 
 241.  See Hearings, supra note 20, at 105 (statement of Ralph F. Hall) (advocating the 
adoption of “more objective criteria for the classification of recalls”). 
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border between these categories is defined by the likelihood and the 
severity of harm that may occur. Device failures that present a 
“reasonable probability” of harm should trigger a Class 1 recall, 
while failures that “may” cause harm should lead to a Class 2 
recall.242 Failures that result in “serious adverse health consequences 
or death” should trigger a Class 1 recall while those that “cause 
temporary or medically reversible adverse health consequences” 
should lead to a Class 2 recall.243 Both of these definitions obviously 
offer latitude that could result in corrections for serious device 
failures being classified as Class 2 recalls. 
One example of a Class 2 recall demonstrates that these concerns 
are germane. The Class 2 recall for the Guidant Contak Renewal 3 
RF implantable cardioverter defibrillator was for “a potential for 
malfunction of a high voltage wire, which could compromise 
effectiveness of shock therapy.”244 Such a failure could result in the 
death of a device recipient in the event the device failed to treat a 
potentially fatal heart rhythm disorder. In fact, this catastrophic 
outcome had already occurred to the recipient of a similar implanted 
cardioverter defibrillator, the Guidant Prizm 2 DR, the correction of 
which the FDA had previously classified as a Class 1 recall.245 
One recent study suggested that the problem is systematic, 
finding that in a subset of devices cleared or approved through the 
510(k) and PMA pathways, the FDA more often than not classified 
 
 242.  21 C.F.R. § 7.3(m) (2017). 
 243.  Id. 
 244.  See Class 2 Device Recall Guidant CONTAK RENEWAL 3 RF & 4 RF, U.S. FOOD 
& DRUG ADMIN., https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfRES/res.cfm?id 
=48748 (last updated Jan. 8, 2018). 
 245.  See Class 1 Device Recall Ventak PRIZM 2 DR ICD, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfRES/res.cfm?id= 39930 (last updated 
Jan. 8, 2018). In other cases, corrective actions for some lots of a device were assigned as a 
Class 1 recall while others were assigned as a Class 2 recall, even though the failure mode was 
the same. See Medical Device Recalls, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.accessdata 
.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfRES/res.cfm?start_search=1&pnumber=P950020 (last updat-
ed Jan. 8, 2018). The manufacturer initiated a corrective action on December 7, 2005, for 
thousands of lots of the device, which had exhibited an increased risk that a malfunctioning 
angioplasty catheter could separate, necessitating emergency open heart surgery. The FDA 
assigned most lots as a Class 1 recall, but assigned others a Class 2 recall. The information 
available on the Recalls webpage indicated that problem was the same in all lots. 
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potentially serious device problems as Class 2 instead of Class 1.246 
This study investigated computer-related failures and recalls, 
suggesting that the devices were relatively complex.247 The 
investigators used a broad definition of “safety-critical” problems to 
include not only Class 1 recalls but also recalls for which the FDA’s 
recall database “indicated a patient safety issue such as injury or 
death” and the “potential for exposing patients or users to 
immediate physical safety hazards such as overdose, overexposure, 
electrical shock, burning, or fire.”248 Out of 197 recalls classified as 
safety-critical by the investigators, 155 (79%) were classified by the 
FDA as a Class 2 recall.249 
This data does not directly address the study I present here. A 
majority of the 197 devices in the study were cleared through the 
510(k) pathway. Further, the investigators employed a broader 
definition of a serious safety issue than does the FDA.250 But even if 
more stringent criteria were employed, their findings suggest that 
the FDA classifies corrective actions as Class 2 recalls for a significant 
portion of potentially fatal device problems. Thus, it is clear that 
using Class 1 recalls as a proxy for compromised device safety will 
underestimate the true risk, and will provide only an upper bound 
for effectiveness of FDA review to ensure device safety. 
Beyond these considerations of underreporting and classification 
errors, there is a more fundamental problem with relying on Class 1 
recalls as a proxy for failures of the premarket evaluation processes to 
detect design and manufacturing flaws. The regulatory standard for a 
Class 2 recall includes situations in which device failures “may cause 
temporary or medically reversible adverse health consequences.”251 
Yet even temporary or reversible consequences may subject patients 
to fear, anxiety, painful complications, and the need for surgery with 
its attendant risks. And these failures may be quite costly to correct. 
For example, the FDA has classified the corrective actions to address 
failures of some hip prostheses as Class 2 recalls, which conforms 
 
 246.  Homa Alemzadeh et al., Analysis of Safety-Critical Computer Failures in Medical 
Devices, IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY, July/August 2013, at 14, 14. 
 247.  See id. at 16. 
 248.  Id. at 15. 
 249.  Id. at 21. 
 250.  Id. 
 251. Industry Guidance, supra note 138; see also 21 C.F.R. § 7.3(m)(2) (2017). 
1.HORVATH_FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/12/2018  10:34 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2017 
1052 
with the definition in 21 C.F.R. § 7.3(m)(2) because these failures 
were unlikely to cause death and could be corrected by surgical 
replacement. However, as Diana Zuckerman has noted, surgery 
“costs an average of $35,000 and results in a 3–5 day hospital stay, at 
least 6 weeks walking with crutches or a walker or cane, 4 weeks 
where the patient is not allowed to drive, and several weeks or 
months of rehab or physical therapy.”252 Just one model of hip 
prosthesis that failed had been implanted into thousands of U.S. 
patients.253 A well-functioning premarket evaluation system should 
minimize device problems that lead to these physical, psychological, 
and financial consequences.254 Studies that rely on Class 1 recalls 
cannot assess these costs of device failures. 
These problems with the use of Class 1 recalls as the sole proxy 
for relevant device failures lead to two suggestions. First, policy 
considerations must be based on the assumption that a risk of 4.6%–
6%, which my study found, represents the best-case estimate of how 
well the PMA process ensures device safety. Second, assuming that 
we cannot define a single, “true” value for this risk, it is imperative 
that future projects attempt to define a worst-case scenario as well. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Undoubtedly, the PMA pathway, through which many high-risk 
medical devices are approved for marketing in the United States, is 
rigorous, imposing significant costs and obligations on 
manufacturers. But the medical literature has raised significant 
concerns about the ability of the PMA process to ensure device 
safety. The study presented here validates many, but not all, of those 
concerns. The best-case scenario is that a significant percentage and 
large numbers of devices fail in ways that present real dangers to 
patients and that impose real costs on health care financing systems. 
 
 252.  Hearings, supra note 20, at 65–67 (statement of Diana Zuckerman); JOHNSON 
2016, supra note 28, at 2. 
 253.  Hearings, supra note 20, at 2 (statement of Frederic Resnic); JOHNSON 2016, 
supra note 28, at 2. 
 254.  See Hearings, supra note 20, at 87 (statement of Ralph F. Hall), for an opposing 
argument. Hall justified the use of Class 1 recalls as a proxy for regulatory failure, citing the 
FDA’s criteria for Class 2 recalls as involving problems that “might cause a temporary health 
problem, or pose only a slight threat of a serious nature,” and by noting that some Class 1 
recalls were for problems carrying only a 1/20,000 risk of death. Id. 
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Two aspects of the statutory and regulatory framework that governs 
the PMA evaluation process appear to contribute to this problem. 
First, Congress’s requirement that the FDA employ the “least 
burdensome” approach to regulation, even of the highest-risk 
devices, has led to device approvals based on less-than-rigorous data. 
Second, the PMA Supplement pathways that allow for repeated, 
significant device modifications without a demonstration of 
overall  safety create a “predicate drift” problem in the most 
complex  devices. 
The changes to the PMA processes I have suggested here—
requiring longer, larger, and more rigorous study data, limiting the 
number of and rate at which 180-Day and Panel-Track supplements 
are granted to complex devices, and averting the shift to a reliance 
on post-market data encouraged by the 21st Century Cures Act—
would partially address these problems. But all of these changes 
would come at a cost: they would tip the balance between safety on 
one hand and the innovation of and access to new technology on the 
other. Manufacturers might not invest the resources need to develop 
new technologies, and patients’ access to those technologies might 
be delayed. 
Balancing these conflicting goals requires a fine-grained analysis. 
How we weigh safety, innovation, and access may—in fact should—
differ depending on the context: a different balance should be struck 
for breakthrough technologies—those that offer effective treatments 
for serious conditions that currently have no effective treatments—
than for the fourth or eighth market entrant providing the same 
treatment as the previous three or seven devices. And how closely we 
scrutinize devices needs to be determined on a more granular level: 
even within the group of high risk, Class III devices, differences in 
complexity and the rate of technological change call for different 
quanta of data to support a finding of a reasonable assurance 
of  safety. 
Any such analysis should be informed by reliable data. If we are 
truly to determine how well or poorly the PMA process is working, a 
more searching analysis of failures of PMA-approved high-risk 
devices is needed. Using Class 1 recalls as a proxy is sure to 
underestimate the true incidence of failures. Adding the relevant 
failures to which the FDA has responded with a Class 2 recall 
classification might be a first step. Examining other data sources, 
while labor-intensive, might also be useful. But as a matter of policy, 
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it would be advisable to know the best-case and the worst-case 
scenarios for how well the PMA evaluation process serves to ensure 
device safety before weakening the existing framework that governs 
that process. 
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Appendix 1 
Class 1 Recalls Announced Between November 1, 2002, and 
November 1, 2016, for Products in Primary Data Set 
Device 
PMA 
Manufacturer 
and Device 
Name  
Date of 
Firm-
Initiated 
Action  
FDA-
Determined 
Cause 
Manufacturer 
Explanation of 
Reason for 
Recall 
Number 
of Units 
Affected 
P020006 Boston Scientific 
Enteryx 
Injectable 
Bulking Agent 
9/23/05 Other “Incorrect 
implantation by 
cause serious 
health 
complications” 
8703 
P030011 Temporary Total 
Artificial Heart 
with Freedom 
Driver System 
8/6/15 Component 
Design/ 
Selection 
Component 
failure “may fail 
and cause the 
drive mechanism 
to stop 
pumping” 
56 
P030025 Boston Scientific 
Taxus Express 
Paclitaxel-
Eluting Stent 
7/1/04 Other Balloon failed to 
deflate after 
stent 
deployment 
209,373 
P040020* Alcon AcrySof 
IQ Toric 
Intraocular Lens 
4/15/15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9/29/15 
Process Design 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Process Design 
Toxic Anterior 
Segment 
Syndrome 
(Post-Operative 
Inflammation of 
eye) 
 
Toxic Anterior 
Segment 
Syndrome 
(Post-Operative 
Inflammation of 
eye) 
45,391 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43,651 
P040025 Natus Medical 
Olympic Cool 
Cap System 
5/9/12 Non-conforming 
Material/ 
Component 
Control screen 
freezes, 
displaying 
information 
although device 
stopped 
functioning 
324 
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P050018 Angioscore 
PTCA Scoring 
Balloon Catheter 
12/4/09 Process Design Catheter shaft 
separates, 
allowing 
fragments to 
lodge in 
coronary arteries 
3870 
P050025 Boston Scientific 
Nexstent 
Carotid Stent 
6/6/08 Component 
Design/ 
Selection 
Catheter tip 
detaches 
1946 
P060040 
(original, 
S004, 
S005) 
Thoratec 
Heartmate II 
Left Ventricular 
Assist Device 
2/23/12 Device Design Disconnected 
bend reliefs 
3852 
P060040  3/4/14 Device Design Death and 
injury during 
change of 
controller unit 
13,938 
P070014 
S032 
Bard Lifestent 
Solo Femoral 
Artery Stent 
9/30/13 Device Design Partial 
deployment 
4112 
P080009 Ethicon 
SEDASYS 
Computer-
Assisted 
Personalized 
Sedation System 
5/13/15 Device Design Disinfection 
degrades plastic 
14 
P100009 Abbott Mitraclip 
Clip Delivery 
System 
2/4/16 Use Error Clip could not 
be detached 
from delivery 
system 
7600 
P100018 Micro 
Therapeutics 
Inc. Pipeline 
Embolization 
Device for 
intracranial 
aneurysms 
4/1/14 Process Change 
Control 
Coating might 
detach from 
delivery wire 
32 
P100022 Cook Zilver 
PTX Drug 
Eluting 
Peripheral Stent 
4/18/13 Process Control Fracture of 
delivery system 
leading to tip 
separation 
1592 
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P100047 HeartWare 
Ventricular 
Assist System 
12/6/13 
 
 
 
1/16/15 
 
 
 
4/29/15 
 
 
 
 
 
7/8/16 
 
 
 
8/17/16 
 
 
 
10/17/16 
Process Control 
 
 
 
Device Design 
 
 
 
Device Design 
 
 
 
 
 
Under 
Investigation 
 
 
Component 
Design/Selection 
 
 
Under 
Investigation 
Driveline 
connector 
separation 
 
Controller 
sensitivity to 
ESD 
 
Damaged or 
bent connection 
pins within 
power supply 
ports 
 
Premature 
Battery 
Depletion 
 
Foreign material 
causing electrical 
faults 
 
Loose connector 
4586 
 
 
 
4845 
 
 
 
3782 
 
 
 
 
 
18,631 
 
 
 
344 
 
 
 
8799 
P120005 
S002, 
S011, 
S018, 
S028, 
S031, 
S033  
Dexcom Inc. G4 
PLATINUM 
invasive glucose 
sensor 
2/23/16 Device Design Failure of 
audible warning 
of severe low or 
high blood 
glucose  
270,111 
P100006 Ovation Prime 
Abdominal Stent 
Graft 
9/20/14 Under 
Investigation by 
Firm 
Rapid emptying 
of polymer 
syringe during 
implant 
procedure 
0 
P130005 Cardiovascular 
Systems, Inc. 
Diamondback 
360 Coronary 
Orbital 
Atherectomy 
System 
3/4/15 Non-confirming 
Material/ 
Component 
Outer sheath 
may flake off 
resulting in 
embolism 
30 
P130021 Medtronic 
EnVeo R Aortic 
Valve Prosthesis 
Delivery System 
 
 
 
7/15/15 Process Control Particular 
Matter 
6912 
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Totals 
18 
Devices 
Artificial Heart/VAD—3 
Stent—5 
Heart Valve—2 
Intraocular Lens—1 
Glucose Monitor—1 
Infant Cooling Cap—1 
Sedation System—1 
Embolization Device—1 
Injectable Bulking Agent—1 
Angioplasty—2 
  662,494 
 
* This device was considered to have had one recall because the second was merely an 
expansion of the first. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
